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BEYOND BALANCING:
RETHINKING THE LAW OF
EMBRYO DISPOSITION
MARY ZIEGLER*
Actress Sofia Vergara became the center of a new round of conflict about the
disposition of embryos created using assisted reproductive technologies (ART): the
conflict about the difference that abortion jurisprudence should make to case law on
ART. This Article argues that the history of abortion jurisprudence sheds light on
the problems with the leading approach to embryo-disposition cases like Vergara’s.
In many instances, courts first look for a clear, binding agreement and look
to a balancing analysis if no such agreement exists. As this Article shows, this
is not the first time that courts have applied a balancing analysis to deal with
clashing rights to seek and avoid genetic parenthood. The Article explores the history
of two balancing approaches that have played a pivotal role in abortion law. These
approaches have led to inconsistent results and cater to the prejudices of judges who
are asked to weigh the relative merits of individual parties’ views on reproduction.
This Article recommends that states adopt legislation detailing the requirements
of an enforceable embryo disposition similar to the Uniform Premarital and
Marital Agreements Act (UPMAA). In the embryo-disposition context, states
should require parties to disclose legal rights and responsibilities rather than only
finances. These disclosures should cover the preservation, implantation, or
destruction of the embryos and the financial and legal responsibility for any
resulting child. States should enforce an embryo-disposition agreement if it is
voluntary, if the parties had counsel or the opportunity to access counsel, and if
the parties had a full disclosure of the constitutional and common law rights
implicated by the agreement.

* Stearns Weaver Miller Professor, Florida State University College of Law. The
Author would like to thank Katherine Baker, Linda Fentiman, Deborah Forman,
Melanie Jacobs, Kevin Maillard, Seema Mohapatra, Mark Spottswood, and Hannah
Wiseman for agreeing to help with earlier versions of this piece.
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INTRODUCTION
Sofia Vergara’s legal troubles have revitalized interest in the law
surrounding embryo disposition.1 Vergara’s ex-fiancé, Nick Loeb,
brought national attention to the issue in 2015 when he filed a lawsuit
to protect and bring to term, two female embryos created by Loeb and
Vergara during their relationship.2 The couple had used in vitro
fertilization (IVF) in the hope of later having a child together.3 The
pair twice attempted IVF, and as is often the case, created more

1. See, e.g., Leanne Aciz Stanton, Sofia Vergara Frozen Embryo Lawsuit Filed by Ex Nick
Loeb Is Dismissed by Louisiana Judge, US WKLY. (Aug. 26, 2017), http://www.
usmagazine.com/celebrity-news/news/sofia-vergaras-frozen-embryo-case-dismissedby-louisiana-judge; Brooke Stanton, Sofia Vergara and the Fraudulent Science of ‘PreEmbryos,’ NAT’L REV. (Sept. 5, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com
/2017/09/sofia-vergara-embryos-pre-embryos-fraudulent-science-lawsuit-nick-loeb;
Louisiana Judge Rules Sofia Vergara’s Frozen Embryos Are ‘Citizens of California,’ WOMEN IN
THE WORLD (Aug. 30, 2017), https://womenintheworld.com/2017/08/30/sofiavergara-picks-up-major-legal-victory-in-bitter-dispute-over-frozen-embryos.
2. Nick Loeb, Opinion, Sofía Vergara’s Ex-Fiancé: Our Frozen Embryos Have a Right
to Live, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/30/opinion/
sofiavergaras-ex-fiance-our-frozen-embryos-have-a-right-to-live.html.
3. Id.
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embryos than would be implanted at a specific time.4 Couples like
Loeb and Vergara often sign consent forms addressing disputes
between patients and fertility clinics, but Loeb and Vergara had no
agreement spelling out what would happen if they broke up.5 In 2014,
their relationship ended; Loeb, seeking to use the embryos, filed a
lawsuit to obtain custody of two embryos called Emma and Isabella.6
Because of Vergara’s celebrity, Loeb quickly found a national
audience. He penned a New York Times op-ed on what he saw as “fathers’
rights.”7 Notably, Loeb also connected his case to the constitutional law
governing abortion.8 He wrote, “[a] woman is entitled to bring a
pregnancy to term even if the man objects. Shouldn’t a man who is
willing to take on all parental responsibilities be similarly entitled to
bring his embryos to term even if the woman objects?”9
Loeb’s comment reflects a larger trend in cases involving the
disposition of embryos created during IVF: the increasing injection of
the abortion conflict into the law and politics of assisted reproductive
technologies (ART).10 Pro-life organizations have formed groups
committed to the legal defense or adoption of embryos.11 Groups like
the National Right to Life Committee (NRLC), which have previously
avoided the issue, have spoken out more forcefully against those
seeking to discard embryos.12
4. Id.
5. Id. On the use of consent forms by couples going through IVF, see Deborah
L. Forman, Embryo Disposition and Divorce: Why Clinic Consent Forms Are Not the Answer,
24 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 57, 58–60 (2011), discussing the inherent problems that
arise when clinic consent forms regarding the disposition of frozen embryos upon
death or divorce of the progenitors are considered enforceable contracts.
6. Loeb, supra note 2.
7. Id.; see also Stanton, supra note 1 (referring to the controversy as “[t]he case of
Emma and Isabella versus Sofia Vergara”).
8. See Loeb, supra note 2 (“Does one person’s desire to avoid biological parenthood . . .
outweigh another’s religious beliefs in the sanctity of life and desire to be a parent?”).
9. Id.
10. See infra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
11. On the work of organizations involved in embryo defense or embryo adoption,
see EMBRYO ADOPTION AWARENESS CTR., https://www.embryoadoption.org (last visited
Dec. 3, 2018); EMBRYO DEF., http://embryodefense.org (last visited Dec. 3, 2018);
Snowflakes Embryo Adoption Program, NIGHTLIGHT CHRISTIAN ADOPTIONS,
https://www.nightlight.org/snowflakes-embryo-adoption-donation/embryo-adoption
(last visited Dec. 3, 2018).
12. See, e.g., Marilyn Synek, A Person Is a Person No Matter How Small (or Frozen), NAT’L
RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS TODAY (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.nationalrighttolifenews.org/
news/2015/01/a-person-is-a-person-no-matter-how-small-or-frozen (describing Synek’s
personal connection to the frozen embryo issue). But see Rebecca Taylor, What Is the Pro-
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This Article argues that the history of abortion doctrine sheds light on
the problems with the leading approach to embryo-disposition cases like
Vergara and Loeb’s. In many instances, courts first look for a clear,
binding agreement between the parties and resort to a balancing
analysis if no such agreement exists.13 As this Article shows, this is not
the first time that courts have applied a balancing analysis to deal with
clashing rights to seek and avoid genetic parenthood. This Article
explores the history of two balancing approaches that played a pivotal
role in abortion law. First, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, pro-lifers,
convinced that Roe v. Wade14 would soon be overruled, stressed the need
for courts to balance a woman’s reasons for seeking an abortion against
a man’s interest in becoming a father.15 Second, in the aftermath of the
Court’s decision in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,16 the lower courts
adopted a balancing approach when determining whether regulations
unduly burden women’s rights to choose abortion.17
The historical application of these balancing tests illuminates serious
problems attached to the balancing of competing interests in the
context of ART. First, these tests have led to inconsistent results.
Second, they cater to the prejudices of judges who are asked to weigh
Life Catholic View of Human Embryo Adoption?, LIFENEWS.COM (June 29, 2011, 12:22 PM),
http://www.lifenews.com/2011/06/29/what-is-the-pro-life-catholic-view-of-human-emb
ryo-adoption (discussing differing opinions among Catholic pro-life supporters about
the morality of embryo adoption).
13. Many courts follow this approach. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Rooks, No.
15CA0990, 2016 WL 6123561, at *4–6 (Colo. App. Oct. 20, 2016) (ruling that the
couple’s embryo storage contract required the court to balance the parties’ competing
interests and in so doing award the embryos to the husband), cert. granted, No.
16SC906, 2017 WL 1377942 (Colo. Apr. 17, 2017); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179–
82 (N.Y. 1998) (upholding the parties’ agreement signed prior to embryo storage
stipulating that, in the event of divorce, pre-embryos would be donated to the IVF
program); In re Marriage of Dahl, 194 P.3d 834, 840–42 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) (ruling in
favor of the wife because the couple’s prior agreement had designated the wife as the
decision maker); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 598–605 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that,
in the absence of an agreement, the husband’s interest in avoiding procreation
weighed more heavily than the wife’s interest in wanting to donate embryos to another
couple); Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40, 48–55 (Tex. App. 2006) (enforcing the
couple’s written agreement to discard the embryos following divorce if the parties are
unable to agree on the disposition of the remaining embryos).
14. 410. U.S. 113 (1973).
15. See infra Section II.A (discussing the pro-life movement’s promotion of a
balancing analysis as a strategy for overruling Roe v. Wade).
16. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
17. See infra Section II.B (discussing abortion rights activists’ insistence on an
undue burden balancing test that has led to inconsistent outcomes).
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the relative merits of individual parties’ views on reproduction. As long
as a balancing approach applies to embryo disputes, couples will be
exposed to humiliating, open-court discussions of their private lives
and judicial evaluation of the merits of their opinions on parenthood.18
Those using ART will also lack badly needed guidance about what will
happen in the event of a dispute.
Courts gravitate toward balancing tests largely because of problems
with any potential contract between the parties or the absence of any
agreement whatsoever.19 But, instead of abandoning a contract
approach, lawmakers should do more to ensure that couples’
agreements on embryo disposition are meaningful and informed. This
Article recommends that states adopt legislation detailing the
requirements of an enforceable embryo disposition agreement similar
to the Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act (UPMAA).20
The parallels between prenuptial agreements and embryo-disposition
agreements are significant. The law on embryo-disposition contracts
should reflect both the similarities and differences between the two
types of bargain. In the embryo-disposition context, states should
require parties to disclose legal rights and responsibilities, rather than
only finances. These disclosures should cover the preservation,
implantation, and destruction of the embryos and the financial and
legal responsibility for any resulting child. Concerns about substantive
unconscionability, most of which touch on financial unfairness to one
party in the prenuptial context,21 are out of place when it comes to the
disposition of embryos. Indeed, asking the courts to weigh in on substantive
unconscionability could create the same problems as balancing tests by
inviting judges to dissect the parties’ motives and personal lives.22 States

18. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Rooks, 2016 WL 6123561, at *6–9 (upholding the
trial court’s finding that the wife’s desire to have a fourth child did not outweigh the
husband’s desire not to father additional children with her and thus experience the
moral and social obligation that would accompany another biological child); Davis,
842 S.W.2d at 603–04 (holding that the husband’s desire to avoid additional financial
responsibilities and his opposition to fathering a child that would have to live in a
single-parent setting weighed more heavily than the wife’s interest in wanting to
donate embryos to another couple).
19. See Forman, supra note 5, at 61–62 (describing the Davis balancing test as “a last resort”).
20. UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT 2 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012)
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/premarital%20and%20marital%20agree
ments/2012_pmaa_final.pdf.
21. Ian Smith, The Law and Economics of Marriage Contracts, 17 J. ECON. SURVS. 201,
215 (2003).
22. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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should determine that an embryo-disposition agreement is enforceable if it
is voluntary, if the parties had counsel or had the opportunity to access
counsel, and if the parties had a full disclosure of the constitutional and
common-law rights implicated by the agreement.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I canvasses the current law
on embryo disposition, focusing on legal and political trends in recent
years that have knit ART and abortion law more closely together. Part
II puts these doctrinal developments in historical context, by studying
past efforts to use balancing to resolve rights to seek and avoid
parenthood. These cases provide a fascinating parallel to
contemporary embryo-disposition suits: at the time, when many
believed that the Supreme Court would overrule Roe very soon, courts
could freely balance competing values and commitments to
procreation.23 As Part II shows, “fathers’ rights” litigation offered courts
several reasons for avoiding a balancing analyses that reach beyond
abortion case law.24 Part III begins to develop an alternative approach
by studying the similarities between prenuptial and embryo-disposition
agreements.25 Part III then proposes and defends a model approach.26
I. THE NEW LAW OF EMBRYO DISPOSITION
Embryo disposition has become one of the most widely-discussed
issues involving reproductive health. Cases like Vergara’s frequently
make front-page news.27 In recent years, organizations like Embryo
Defense have formed to fund litigation and public education on the
rights some assign to pre-embryos created during IVF.28 Other

23. See infra Section II.A.
24. See infra notes 177–183, 208–216 and accompanying text.
25. See infra Section III.A.
26. See infra Section III.B.1.
27. See supra note 1 and accompanying text; see also Laurie J. Pawlitza, Battle over
Embryo Highlights Family Law’s New Fertility Frontier, FIN. POST (Sept. 5, 2018, 5:00 AM),
https://business.financialpost.com/personal-finance/battle-over-embryo-highlightsfamily-laws-new-fertility-frontier (examining a dispute arising in Canada over embryos
purchased from Georgia with no biological relation to either spouse); Julia Marsh,
Woman Must Turn over Embryo for Estranged Hubby to Destroy: Judges, N.Y. POST (June 5,
2018, 7:34 PM), https://nypost.com/2018/06/05/woman-must-turn-over-embryo-forestranged-hubby-to-destroy-judges (noting that the judge’s decision was based on the
contract that the couple had signed that “allowed either party to revoke their consent
to use the embryo at any time”).
28. See EMBRYO DEF., supra note 11 (featuring “resource[s] for all parents,
advocates, lawyers, and anybody interested in saving frozen embryos”).
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organizations have specialized in embryo adoption.29 The Snowflakes
Embryo Adoption Program, founded in 1998, facilitated the first
embryo adoption30 and more recently, the United States Department of
Health and Human Services’ Office of Population Affairs has provided
grants to increase awareness of embryo adoption as an option.31
From the outset, the relationship between embryo disposition and
abortion was complex. In the mid-1980s, when the Vatican took a
strong stand against IVF and other assisted reproductive technologies,
most anti-abortion and social-conservative groups stayed on the
sidelines.32 While never focusing on IVF, pro-life groups have
consistently opposed selective reduction,33 a procedure in which a
doctor implants more embryos than are expected to be born and then
aborts some fetuses to maximize the chances that others will come to
term.34 Abortion opponents and some disability-rights groups have
also opposed prenatal genetic diagnosis involved in ART, believing
that it leads families to end pregnancies.35 While judges have created

29. See EMBRYO ADOPTION AWARENESS CTR., supra note 11 (promoting embryo
adoption as a “proven successful process allowing families with remaining embryos to
donate them to another family desiring to experience pregnancy and childbirth”);
NIGHTLIGHT CHRISTIAN ADOPTIONS, supra note 11 (assisting adoptive families to “use . . .
donated embryos to achieve a pregnancy and give birth to their adopted child”).
30. Why Choose Snowflakes?, NIGHTLIGHT CHRISTIAN ADOPTIONS, https://www.night
light.org/snowflakes-embryo-adoption-donation/embryo-adoption/why-choose-snowflakes
(last visited Dec. 3, 2018).
31. Embryo
Adoption,
U.S.
DEP’T
HEALTH
&
HUM.
SERVS.,
https://www.hhs.gov/opa/about-opa/embryo-adoption (last visited Dec. 3, 2018).
32. See, e.g., Robin Toner, The Vatican’s Doctrine: Political Impact; Contrast to Abortion Is
Discerned, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 1987), https://www.nytimes.com/1987/03/ 12/us/thevatican-s-doctrine-political-impact-contrast-to-abortion-issue-is-discerned.html (observing
that the complex ethical questions posed by ART precluded the emergence of a powerful
consensus on the right akin to that witnessed during the abortion debate).
33. See, e.g., Liza Mundy, Too Much to Carry?, WASH. POST (May 20, 2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/15/AR2007051
501730.html (arguing against the termination of any life following conception unless
the mother’s life is at risk); Alan L. Otten, Technological Advances in the Science of Birth
Alter the Setting of High Court’s Abortion Ruling, WALL ST. J., June 28, 1989, at A16 (noting
ART’s dilemma causing potential to both create a baby and encourage the abortion of
fetuses in order to promote the long-term viability of others).
34. See Stacey Pinchuk, A Difficult Choice in a Different Voice: Multiple Births, Selective
Reduction and Abortion, 7 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 29, 30–31 (2000) (describing the
medical procedures involved in selective reductions).
35. See, e.g., Kim Painter, How Much Do You Want to Know? Doctors Have Prenatal Tests
for 450 Genetic Diseases, USA TODAY, Aug. 15, 1997, at A1 (citing opponents’ view that
“testing itself is not the problem,” but rather what is often done based on the test results).
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rules that apply only to assisted reproduction, abortion law still casts a
shadow over ART jurisprudence.36
Courts could choose to apply abortion doctrine to resolve ART
disputes, as Professor Judith Daar has recommended.37 In fact, on
some matters, abortion doctrine has strongly influenced embryodisposition cases. For example, abortion jurisprudence encouraged
courts to view an embryo as neither a person nor a piece of property.38
For the most part, however, courts have used ART cases as an
opportunity to rethink the rights at stake in assisted reproduction and
to create a better approach to clashing views about parenthood.39
Courts have created three main approaches to embryo-disposition
cases: a balancing analysis40; a contract-based approach;41 and the
mutual, contemporaneous agreement approach.42 This Part surveys
each of these approaches and the arguments often used for and against
them. This survey shows that notwithstanding criticisms of a balancing
analysis, courts continue to adopt similar approaches because the

36. See, e.g., Mary Ziegler, Abortion and the Constitutional Right (Not) to Procreate, 48
U. RICH. L. REV. 1263, 1263–64 (2014) (warning that, although “abortion case law may
provide the strongest constitutional foundation for [those] seeking rights to access
ART or avoid unwanted parenthood[,] . . . abortion jurisprudence carries normative
and political baggage”).
37. See generally Judith F. Daar, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pregnancy
Process: Developing an Equality Model to Protect Reproductive Liberties, 25 AM. J.L. & MED.
455, 458–69 (1999) (disputing court rulings that embryo disposition does not
implicate women’s constitutional right to privacy or bodily integrity in the context of
reproductive choice and applying the abortion rights framework to pre-embryos).
38. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 774–76 (Iowa 2003)
(observing that “the factors that are relevant in determining the custody of children
in dissolution cases are simply not useful” in the ART context); McQueen v. Gadberry,
507 S.W.3d 127, 141–49 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (classifying pre-embryos as “marital
property of a special character”); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 594–97 (Tenn. 1992)
(concluding that pre-embryos “occupy an interim category that entitles them to special
respect because of their potential for human life”).
39. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Rooks, No. 15CA0990, 2016 WL 6123561, at *6 (Colo.
App. Oct. 20, 2016) (ruling that the couple’s embryo-disposition agreement required
the court to balance the parties’ competing interests); Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604 (using
a balancing approach where spouses had not agreed on disposition of embryos in the
event of divorce).
41. See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179–80 (N.Y. 1998) (looking to the
parties’ agreement to determine the disposition of disputed embryos).
42. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 783 (holding that in the absence
of mutual, contemporaneous consent, embryos are to remain in storage with the party
opposing destruction paying storage fees).
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parties lack a convincing contract and because the gravity of the
interests involved, both constitutional and otherwise.
A. Davis and the Balancing Approach
Davis v. Davis,43 the foundational case articulating a balancing
approach, stemmed from the divorce of Mary Sue and Junior Davis.44
The Davises previously pursued IVF after struggling to get pregnant.45
Optimistic about the outcome, Mary Sue and Junior did not discuss or
agree on the disposition of excess pre-embryos.46 After one attempt at
implantation failed, Junior filed for divorce,47 and Mary Sue requested
custody of the pre-embryos.48 The trial court found that the preembryos were children and awarded custody to Mary Sue.49 The
Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed, holding that abortion
doctrine—particularly the holding in Roe that a fetus was not a
person—contradicted the trial court’s ruling.50 Mary Sue appealed this
decision to the Tennessee Supreme Court.51
But what is a pre-embryo? To answer this question, the court first
examined state and federal law and found little support for the idea that
an embryo was a person.52 However, the Tennessee Supreme Court also
found it unconvincing to describe an embryo as property.53 Relying on
ethical guidance from the American Fertility Society, the court
identified a middle-ground position: an embryo deserves special respect
because of its “potential to become a person,” but it should not be
treated the same as an actual person.54 In resolving embryo-disposition
cases, the court articulated a preference for relying on contracts

43. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
44. Id. at 592.
45. Id. at 591.
46. Id. at 592.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 589.
49. Id.
50. See Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807, at *2–3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13,
1990) (examining Tennessee statutes that incorporate the Roe trimester framework);
see also Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 594–95.
51. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589–90.
52. See id. at 594–95 (affirming the Court of Appeals’s finding that pre-embryos are
not protected as persons under state or federal law).
53. See id. at 595–97.
54. Id. at 596 (quoting Ethics Comm. Am. Fertility Soc’y, Ethical Considerations of
the New Reproductive Technologies, 53 FERTILITY & STERILITY S1, S35 (Supp. 2 June 1990)).
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between the parties.55 This preference reflected “the proposition that
the progenitors, having provided the gametic material giving rise to the
pre-embryos, retain decision making authority as to their disposition.”56
But there was no clear agreement between Junior and Mary Sue, and
the court refused to read the couple’s very willingness to do IVF as an
implied contract.57 The court instead concluded that it had no choice
but to balance the parties’ interests in seeking or avoiding procreation.58
Citing cases on contraception, abortion, and parental rights and
responsibilities, the court concluded that “the right of procreational
autonomy is composed of two rights of equal significance—the right to
procreate and the right to avoid procreation.”59 In the IVF context, the
rights at issue differ from those that apply in the abortion context.60 In
abortion jurisprudence, because only women (and trans-men) can
become pregnant, concerns about women’s bodily integrity justified
more decision-making authority.61 No similar physical limitations
governed IVF.62 In the context of ART, as the court in Davis reasoned,
a court should look closely at each party’s reasons for seeking and
avoiding genetic parenthood.63
The court then applied this approach to the facts of Davis. Having
grown up in a home for abandoned children, Junior strongly opposed
raising a child in a home with only one parent.64 On the other hand,
Mary Sue wanted to donate the embryos to another couple to ensure
that the difficulties she had endured during the IVF process were not
in vain.65 The Davis court reasoned that Junior’s interest in avoiding
parenthood outweighed Mary Sue’s desire to give the embryos to an
55. See id. at 597 (“We believe, as a starting point, that an agreement regarding
disposition of any untransferred pre-embryos in the event of contingencies . . . should
be presumed valid and should be enforced as between the progenitors.”).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 598.
58. See id. at 603 (“One way of resolving these disputes is to consider the positions
of the parties, the significance of their interests, and the relative burdens that will be
imposed by differing resolutions.”).
59. Id. at 601 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
60. See id. (noting the “inherent tension” between the two rights in the IVF context).
61. See id. (emphasizing that such concerns “precluded men from controlling
abortion decisions”).
62. See id. (viewing Mary Sue and Junior as “entirely equivalent gamete-providers”
in the embryo-disposition analysis).
63. Id. at 602–03.
64. Id. at 604.
65. Id.
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infertile couple.66 Had Mary Sue wished to use the embryos herself,
the Davis court would have allowed her to do so over Junior’s objection
only if doing so was her only way to become a parent.67 Since Mary Sue
could adopt, the court reasoned that her interest in seeking
reproduction was less significant than Junior’s interest in avoiding it.68
The Davis court, in some ways, seemed to reach a satisfactory
outcome. Since few couples entered into meaningful written
agreements before availing themselves of IVF, a balancing analysis
seemed to be an important safety net in embryo disputes. Moreover,
since both the right to procreate and to avoid procreation were
arguably at stake in IVF cases, a balancing approach allowed courts to
give each interest proper respect all the while paying attention to the
specifics of each claimant’s circumstances.69 Indeed, Davis’s approach
did attract adherents, as illustrated by the New York Court of Appeals’s
decision in Kass v. Kass.70
B. Kass and the Contract-Based Approach
While Davis praised a contract-based approach, Kass became the first
to apply it.71 Kass also involved a married couple who had struggled to
conceive.72 Maureen and Steve Kass enrolled in an IVF program at
John T. Mather Memorial Hospital.73 To participate in the program, the
couple had to sign four forms.74 In an addendum to one form, the two
elected to have the excess eggs inseminated and cryopreserved for
possible future use by the couple.75 Maureen and Steve completed an
additional consent form discussing what would happen in the event of
the couple’s death or “other unforeseen circumstances,” and decided to
allow the IVF program to use the remaining embryos for research.76 The
Kasses tried IVF using Maureen’s sister as a surrogate, but the procedure
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
70. 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
71. See Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice: An
Inalienable Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55, 72–73 (1999)
(acknowledging that Kass is the only other decision from a state’s high court to address
the issue of pre-embryo disposition).
72. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 175.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 176.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 176–77.
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failed, and the two subsequently filed for divorce.77 Maureen sought sole
custody of the embryos, which she planned to have implanted.78
The trial court looked to abortion jurisprudence to evaluate the
Kasses’ dispute.79 The court reasoned that just as a pregnant woman had
sole decision-making authority in the context of ending a pregnancy, an
infertile woman should determine what happened to fertilized
embryos.80 A divided Appellate Division reversed.81 The New York
Court of Appeals reiterated the value of written contracts in embryodisposition matters.82 The court explained that prior written agreements
“both minimize misunderstandings and maximize procreative liberty by
reserving to the progenitors the authority to make what is in the first
instance a quintessentially personal, private decision.”83
The court then set out an approach to the interpretation of embryodisposition contracts: judges should discern the parties’ “overall intention”
and then construe a contract accordingly.84 Notwithstanding some
ambiguity in the contract, the court concluded that its overall intent was for
the parties to make a joint decision about the disposition of the embryos
and to make the embryos available for research in the event of divorce, as
well as the specifically enumerated “unforeseen circumstances.”85
The Kass approach appealed to many courts tackling embryo
disposition as a matter of first impression.86 It seemed intuitively right
to allow the parties to reach their own decision about embryo
disposition rather than asking the court to balance the competing

77. Id. at 177.
78. Id.
79. See Kass v. Kass, No. 95-02615, 1995 WL 110368, at *1–3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995).
80. See id. at *3 (asserting that conception by IVF does not give rise to new rights
on behalf of the father and therefore making the wife’s interest paramount).
81. Kass v. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
82. See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180 (citing Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn.
1992)) (“Agreements between progenitors, or gamete donors, regarding disposition
of their pre-zygotes should generally be presumed valid and binding, and enforced in
any dispute between them . . . .”).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 181.
85. See id. (reviewing the multiple consent forms signed by the couple as a whole).
86. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Dahl, 194 P.3d 834, 840–41 (Or. Ct. App. 2008)
(adopting the Davis and Kass framework of enforcing the intent of the progenitors’
advance agreement); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 270–71 (Wash. 2002) (en banc)
(bypassing the issue of whether the pre-embryos were “children” and basing its
decision “solely upon the contractual rights of the parties under the pre-embryo
cryopreservation contract”).
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interests and reach an outcome.87 Many couples entered into an
agreement with fertility clinics before beginning IVF, and these
documents provided some guidance for judges.88 Still, due to the
dissatisfaction with Kass, other courts continued to search for an
alternative approach.89
C. Witten and Mutual, Contemporaneous Consent
The Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in In re Marriage of Witten90
reflects discontent with the contract-centered approaches articulated
in both Davis and Kass.91 Trip and Tamera Witten had unsuccessfully
tried to procreate using IVF, and after Trip filed for divorce, Tamara
sought custody of the embryos.92 The Wittens had executed an agreement
with the University of Nebraska Medical Center, which provided that the
embryos would not be released for use without the consent of both
parties.93 The only exception covered the death of Trip and/or Tamara.94
The trial court relied on this agreement in determining what should
happen to the embryos, and held that neither side could transfer or
otherwise dispose of the embryos without the other’s written consent.95
The Iowa Supreme Court rejected this approach.96
The court concluded that the parties’ agreement was broad enough
to cover the parties’ divorce,97 but avoided the contract-based approach

87. See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180 (“To the extent possible, it should be the
progenitors—not the State and not the courts—who by their prior directive make this
deeply personal life choice.”).
88. Forman, supra note 5, at 58–59 (noting that it is common practice for IVF clinics
to require consent forms and the initial determination of courts to view them as binding).
89. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 71, at 88–89 (criticizing the Kass contract
approach for failing to take into account the “contemporaneous wishes, values, and
beliefs” of the parties).
90. 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003).
91. See id. at 781–82 (finding that it was against public policy “to enforce a prior
agreement between the parties in this highly personal area of reproductive choice
when one of the parties has changed his or her mind concerning the disposition or
use of the embryos”).
92. Id. at 772.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See id. at 773.
96. See id. at 783 (rejecting the contract approach but affirming the trial court’s ruling
that the embryos could not be used or transferred without the consent of both parties).
97. Id. at 773 (noting that the agreement did not expressly address disposition upon
divorce but finding that it was encompassed by the general provision “release of embryos”).
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for policy reasons.98 Given the importance of reproductive decisions,
the court reasoned that individuals had the right to make decisions
that align with their present-day values.99 Further, the court stated that
individuals would perform particularly poorly when predicting their
decisions about major, distant events like parenthood.100 The Witten
court also criticized a pure balancing test and suggested that, in
applying such a test, courts would too often substitute their views for
those of the parties.101
As an alternative, the court adopted a mutual, contemporaneous
consent approach. Under this approach, no embryo will be used,
destroyed, or donated without the consent of both parties who created
the embryo.102 If the couple could not reach an agreement, the status
quo of preservation would prevail regardless of any prior agreement.103
In Witten, the court prioritized the parties’ present-day desire (or
lack thereof) to seek out parenthood. In principle, allowing parties to
avoid unwanted parenthood is just and sensible, and mutual,
contemporaneous consent provides a mechanism whereby parties can
resolve embryo disputes amongst themselves.104 In practice, as a
dispute resolution mechanism, mutual, contemporaneous consent
seems far less than pragmatic. By the time the parties have dug in and
embraced litigation, it is quite unlikely that anyone will reach a
present-day consensus. Partly for this reason, balancing analyses have
become increasingly significant.

98. Id. at 780–82.
99. See id. at 783 (concluding that one party can withdraw from a prior agreement
after clearly expressing to the other party that “the agreement no longer reflects his
or her current values or wishes”).
100. See id. at 778 (“One’s erroneous prediction of how she or he will feel about the
matter at some point in the future can have grave repercussions.”).
101. See id. at 779 (arguing that the same policy concerns precluding the enforcement
of contracts against progenitors who have changed their minds also support the position
that judges should not substitute their own decisions for that of the progenitors).
102. See id. at 782–83 (recognizing that a prior agreement can still serve as guidance
for the parties until a party declares an objection to the agreement).
103. Id. at 783.
104. See id. at 783 (providing that the embryos will not be transferred, released,
disposed of, or used without signed consent from both parties and that, if the parties
cannot reach an agreement, the embryos will be preserved indefinitely, with the party
opposing disposition bearing the costs).
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D. The Prominence of Balancing
Most courts that have heard embryo-disposition disputes have
adopted a version of the Davis and Kass approaches, applying a valid
contract if possible and balancing the parties’ interests if no viable
agreement was in place.105 Notwithstanding a stated preference for a
contract-based approach, many states have had to turn to a balancing
test.106 When an agreement does exist, courts have hesitated to bind
parties to them, especially since many of the forms do not specifically
contemplate divorce.107 Given potential problems with clinic-consent
forms, the frequency of balancing might not seem to be a bad thing.
The informed consent documents that parties sign at clinics are often
long and complex, combining medical and legal matters.108 Research
suggests that couples frequently change their minds after starting

105. See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 177–78, 181 (N.Y. 1998) (recognizing the
Davis balancing approach but enforcing the intent of the parties found in the contract
agreement); In re Marriage of Dahl, 194 P.3d 834, 840–41 (Or. Ct. App. 2008)
(adopting the Davis and Kass framework resulting in the enforcement of the
progenitors advance agreement); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992)
(noting that a “prior agreement concerning disposition should be carried out,” but in
the absence of an agreement, “the relative interests of the parties . . . must be
weighed”); Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. App. 2006) (enforcing the voluntary
contractual agreement that explicitly dealt with the issue of disposition upon divorce).
106. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Rooks, No. 15CA0990, 2016 WL 6123561, at *4–5
(Colo. App. Oct. 20, 2016) (applying the balancing approach after finding that the
written agreement expressly left the determination of disposition to the court);
Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1161–63 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (holding that
advance agreements are enforceable but adopting a balancing approach in the
absence of such agreement); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 714–15, 719–20 (N.J. 2001)
(finding that the written agreement did not contemplate divorce and resorting to a
balancing test to determine disposition); Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1136 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2012) (adopting the balancing approach after determining that the disposition
agreement was not enforceable due to the parties’ lack of signature on the
agreement); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 10 P.3d 1086, 1091–93 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000)
(declining to read an implied willingness to continue with procreation upon divorce
into the contract and implementing a balancing test to determine disposition), rev’d,
48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002).
107. See, e.g., Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1154–55 (finding that an informed consent
form did not serve as an advanced agreement modifying the parties’ oral contract);
J.B., 783 A.2d at 714–15 (determining that the contract did not specifically address
disposition upon divorce, but rather left it to the court’s determination); Reber, 42 A.3d
at 1136 (refusing to enforce the agreement because it was not signed by the parties).
108. See Forman, supra note 5, at 69 (commenting that the large amount of
information on consent forms can hinder decision-making).
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treatment.109 The circumstances surrounding the signing of an
informed consent form suggest that at least some couples sign papers
without even reading the contracts.110
Mutual, contemporaneous consent, while attractive in theory, almost
inevitably favors the party who is happy with the status quo. Some couples
will certainly be able to agree on the disposition of embryos after splitting
up. But for many, there will never be any mutual, contemporaneous
consent.
In these scenarios, parties avoiding procreation will
systematically do better than those seeking procreation.111 While this may
be a desirable result, the mutual, contemporaneous consent approach
does not force courts to grapple with whether one of the two related
procreative rights should outweigh the other.112
Is a balancing test the lesser of all evils? Part II addresses this question
by studying the history of a similar balancing approach in the abortion
context. Part II first examines pro-life efforts to convince the courts to
adopt a balancing test when biological fathers and mothers disagree
about abortion.113 Then Part II explores the application of a more
recent, but less closely related, balancing approach authorized by Whole
Woman’s Health.114 This history suggests that a balancing approach to
ART is far more problematic than we might have imagined.
109. See, e.g., Susan L. Crockin, The “Embryo” Wars: At the Epicenter of Science, Law,
Religion, and Politics, 39 FAM. L.Q. 599, 615–16 (2005) (citing a 2003 study finding that
seventy-one percent of patients contacted at least three years after freezing their
embryos changed their initial dispositional choice). Research also suggested that fifty
to seventy-five percent of patients who initially express a desire to donate excess
embryos do not ultimately choose to do so. Id.; see also Susan C. Klock et al., The
Disposition of Unused Frozen Embryos, 345 NEW ENG. J. MED. 69, 69 (2001) (explaining
that, in a study at the IVF clinic at Northwestern University School of Medicine,
seventy-one percent of couples changed their disposition choice after three months);
C.R. Newton et al., Changes in Patient Preferences in the Disposal of Cryopreserved Embryos,
22 HUM. REPROD. 3124, 3124 (2007) (“[A] willingness to donate embryos for research
purposes declined once couples had ended their participation in IVF compared with
attitudes before treatment.”).
110. See Forman, supra note 5, at 75–76 (explaining that, while no empirical study
exists, evidence from adjudicated cases indicates that it is not uncommon for at least
one party to fail to review the documents before signing).
111. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604 (“Ordinarily, the party wishing to avoid procreation
should prevail, assuming that the other party has a reasonable possibility of achieving
parenthood by means other than use of the pre[-]embryos in question.”).
112. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 778 (Iowa 2003) (explaining the
contemporaneous mutual consent framework in which disagreement between
progenitors results in maintaining the “status quo” rather than judicial intervention).
113. See infra Section II.A.
114. See infra Section II.B.
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II. THE PROBLEMS WITH BALANCING
Both pro-life and abortion-rights activists have relied on balancing
analyses in the past.115 This Part explores cases that illuminate the
problems with adopting a similar approach in the context of ART.
First, this Part explores how both pro-life and pro-choice activists have
relied on balancing analyses in the past.116 Pro-life activists urged
courts to use a balancing test when a potential father objected to an
abortion.117 Pro-choice activists pitted a woman’s rights to choose
against a man’s right to parent and urged courts to balance each
potential parent’s interest in seeking or avoiding parenthood.118 Next,
this Part examines the balancing test courts use to determine the
constitutionality of state laws regulating a woman’s access to
abortion.119 In Whole Woman’s Health, the Supreme Court balanced the
woman’s interest in receiving an abortion against any benefits of the
regulation.120
By providing in depth case summaries, this Part
demonstrates that each approach presents its own unique consequences
that counsel against adopting similar approaches in the context of ART.
A. Balancing Men’s Rights in the Abortion Context
In Roe, the Supreme Court held that women have a right to privacy,
and this right includes the right to obtain an abortion.121 To determine
whether abortion regulations violate this fundamental right, the Court
balanced the woman’s privacy interest against the state’s interest in
regulating abortion.122 Organized opposition to abortion reaches back
to the 1930s and 1940s when Catholics linked anti-contraception and

115. See Martha Brannigan, Suits Argue Fathers’ Rights in Abortion—One Plaintiff Has
Petitioned Supreme Court, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 1988, at 29 (quoting the general counsel
of the National Right to Life Committee stating that “[t]he right to an abortion is not
an absolute one,” and explaining their litigation strategy of asking courts for a case-bycase balancing approach of the father’s interests against the mother’s).
116. See infra Sections II.A, II.B.
117. See infra notes 142–145 and accompanying text.
118. See infra notes 144–151 and accompanying text.
119. See infra notes 242–243 and accompanying text.
120. See infra notes 258–271 and accompanying text.
121. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1976) (“This right of privacy, whether it be
founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty . . . or, as the District
Court determined in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad
enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”).
122. Id.
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anti-abortion sentiment.123
These organizations reframed their
opposition to abortion under the Declaration of Independence and
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under
this approach, pro-life organizations argued that both the born and
unborn were equally entitled to legal protection.124
After Roe, pro-lifers favored a constitutional amendment that would
outlaw all abortions.125 However, from the beginning, abortion foes
also looked to pass laws that would limit access to abortion and
favorably shape public opinion.126 Statutes requiring women to obtain
their husbands’ consent seemed to satisfy these criteria.127
The Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a model
spousal-consent statute in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth.128 In Roe, the Court specifically reserved the question of
whether a state could require the consent of a woman’s husband,129 but

123. See DANIEL K. WILLIAMS, DEFENDERS OF THE UNBORN: THE PRO-LIFE MOVEMENT
BEFORE ROE V. WADE 4–5 (2016) (articulating the connection between the argument
against abortion and contraception which grew into the Catholics’ argument for
inalienable rights of an unborn fetus).
124. See, e.g., id.; MARY ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE: THE LOST HISTORY OF THE ABORTION
DEBATE 37 (2015) (explaining the view that the Constitution contains an implied
fundamental right to a life—a right that extends to the fetus because such supporters
saw the fetus as a human).
125. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 123, at 12; ZIEGLER, supra note 124, at 37.
126. See Nat’l Right to Life Comm. Ad Hoc Strategy Meeting, Meeting Minutes 2–7 (Feb.
11, 1973) (discussing legislative initiatives across the country to limit abortion and expressing
the opinion that such initiatives keep pro-lifers “reved up” and educate the public).
127. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 453.030.3 (1969), invalidated by Planned Parenthood
of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). Rights for men struck a chord with
leading pro-life scholars. Roe “provided one more wedge to separate, undermine and
ultimately destroy the nuclear family,” argued Dennis Horan, a founding member of
Americans United for Life (AUL). See Abortion Part IV: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Amendments of the S. Judiciary Comm., 94th Cong. 258 (1975) (statement
of Sen. Horan). Joseph Witherspoon, a professor at the University of Texas and
leading NRLC member, argued that abortion violated the Thirteenth Amendment by
taking the life of an unborn child and depriving fathers of their rights as men. See
Proposed Constitutional Amendments on Abortion Part I: Testimony Before the Subcomm. On
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H Judiciary Comm., 94th Cong. 543 (1976) (statement
of Rep. Witherspoon).
128. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
129. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 n.67 (1973) (“Neither in this opinion nor
in Doe v. Bolton . . . do we discuss the father’s rights, if any exist in the constitutional
context, in the abortion decision . . . . We are aware that some statutes recognize the
father under certain circumstances . . . . We need not now decide whether provisions
of this kind are constitutional.”).
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Danforth struck down such a requirement.130 The Court reasoned that
if the government could not constitutionally veto a woman’s abortion
decision in the first trimester, the state could not delegate that power
to anyone else.131 To recognize a right for men to consent would, as
the Danforth Court suggested, establish that abortion was not a fullfledged constitutional right.132 While the Court suggested that women
often did, and should, consult with their husbands, it saw the legal
requirements quite differently.133 “The obvious fact is that when the
wife and the husband disagree on this decision, the view of only one of
the two marriage partners can prevail,” the Danforth Court reasoned.134
The Court recognized that because pregnancy affects a woman more
seriously, “the balance weighs in her favor.”135
Despite the outcome of Danforth, pro-life groups continued looking
for ways to give men rights in the abortion context.136 Because
Missouri’s law awarded men an outright veto, pro-lifers hoped that a
narrower law, or a spousal-notification statute,137 would be
constitutional.138 Cases on the subject seemed to multiply rapidly, with
men from Tennessee, Maryland, and Connecticut trying to stop their
wives from having abortions.139 Seven states passed spousal-notification

130. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 69 (“We now hold that the State may not constitutionally
require the consent of the spouse . . . as a condition for abortion . . . .”).
131. Id.
132. See id. at 69–71.
133. See id. at 71 (reasoning that the objective of preserving the marital relationship
will not be furthered by giving a husband unlimited veto power over his wife).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., Pamela Black, Abortion Affects Men, Too, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 1982),
https://www.nytimes.com/1982/03/28/magazine/abortion-affects-men-too.html
(illustrating “men’s reactions to their partners’ abortions” and the possible impact of
spousal notification laws); Husband Challenges Wife’s Right to Abortion, 12 OFF OUR BACKS
13, 13 (Nov. 1982) (discussing a husband who attempted to prevent his wife’s abortion
via a court-ordered injunction).
137. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.735 (West 2018) (requiring the physician
performing the abortion to “notify, if reasonably possible, the spouse of the woman
upon whom the abortion is to be performed”); Black, supra note 136 (explaining that
spousal-consent laws required women to obtain their husbands permission whereas
spousal-notification laws merely required women to notify their husbands prior to
having an abortion).
138. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 69 (ruling that spousal-consent statutes were
unconstitutional but giving no opinion on spousal-notification statutes).
139. See Husband Challenges Wife’s Right to Abortion, supra note 136, at 13.
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laws between 1976 and 1989.140 Polls consistently suggested that a
slight majority of Americans favored spousal-notification requirements,
and some courts upheld them.141
As some activists urged state legislatures to enact a spousalinvolvement statutes, two of the pro-life movement’s leading lawyers,
James Bopp Jr. (Bopp) and Richard Coleson (Coleson), promoted a
case-by-case balancing approach.142 Bopp and Coleson first advocated
for a balancing approach in Smith v. Doe,143 in which John Smith (a
pseudonym), a twenty-four-year-old delivery truck driver from Vigo
County, Indiana, sought to stop his eighteen-year-old girlfriend from
terminating her pregnancy.144 The two attorneys emphasized that
Smith’s interests in protecting and acting as a father to his unborn
child outweighed any countervailing right that Jane Doe could
identify.145 “We think the courts have to decide how the rights of the
father should be balanced against the rights of the mother,” Bopp
explained.146 Bopp and Coleson claimed that a father’s interest in
unborn children outweighed any negative consequences a woman
might face because of an unplanned pregnancy (such as the loss of

140. See Barbara Ryan & Eric Plutzer, When Married Women Have Abortions: Spousal
Notification and Marital Interaction, 51 J. MARR. & FAM. 41, 41, 49 (1989) (Florida, Illinois,
Kentucky, Montana, Nevada, Rhode Island, and Utah).
141. For a more information about ongoing support for spousal-involvement laws
for abortion, see Abortion, GALLUP, http://news.gallup.com/poll/1576/abortion.aspx
(last visited Dec. 3, 2018); Lydia Saad, Public Opinion on Abortion—An In-Depth Review,
GALLUP (Jan. 22, 2002), http://news.gallup.com/poll/9904/public-opinion-aboutabortion-indepth-review.aspx.
142. See, e.g., Brannigan, supra note 115, at 29 (discussing Bopp’s “well-organized
and multifaceted campaign” to bring anti-abortion cases to court); Father’s Rights at
Issue in Abortion Case, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 15, 1988, at 3 [hereinafter Father’s Rights at Issue]
(illustrating Bopp’s efforts to take legal action on behalf of would-be fathers
attempting to prevent women’s abortions); Tamar Lewin, Woman Has Abortion,
Violating Court’s Order on Paternal Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 1988),
https://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/14/us/woman-has-abortion-violating-court-sorder-on-paternal-rights.html (discussing men using the legal system to try to stop
their partners’ abortions); David G. Savage, Fathers’ Appeals to Justices Ask Equal Rights to
Children, Even Unborn, L.A. TIMES (Sep. 25, 1988), http://articles.latimes.com/198809-25/news/mn-3861_1_equal-rights (noting husbands’ and wives’ competing
interests in unborn children in a divorce dispute).
143. 492 U.S. 919 (1988).
144. See Abortion Case Sent to Lower Court, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 15, 1988, at 1; Father’s Rights
at Issue, supra note 142; Lewin, supra note 142.
145. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8–22, Smith v. Doe, 492 U.S. 919 (1988) (No. 881837); see also Lewin, supra note 142 (emphasizing balancing the mother’s and father’s rights).
146. Lewin, supra note 142.
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opportunities for further education or a career, the stigma of unwed
motherhood, or the financial burden of raising a child, and so on).147
Bopp and Coleson certainly wanted to help John Smith, but they
thought that a balancing test could undermine abortion rights more
broadly. First, if a court looked at case-specific factors, like a woman’s
interest in education or financial security, the availability of an
abortion right would depend entirely on a woman’s ability to tell a story
that was emotionally compelling to a particular judge.148 Judges’
prejudices or embrace of sex stereotypes would limit any applicable
abortion right.149 Moreover, if a court suggested that men’s interests
in parenthood outweighed at least some women’s abortion rights, then
abortion rights would be far weaker.150 Second, the lawyers believed
that they could package a balancing test as a modest measure, or as a
step that a court could take without officially rejecting a constitutional
right to abortion.151
Additionally, Bopp and Coleson understood how going to court could
deter women from exercising their abortion rights. Jane Doe’s
experience in Smith v. Doe reinforced their conclusions. Noting that she
would be forced to testify about her sexual history and moral positions,
Jane Doe refused to testify.152 Ultimately, Judge Robert Howard Brown,
of the Vigo Circuit Court, sided with Bopp and Coleson and issued an
order blocking her from terminating her pregnancy.153 Notwithstanding
the court’s conclusion that Roe recognized a fundamental abortion right
for women, it found that Jane Doe did not have sufficient reasons for
terminating her pregnancy.154 The court stated that John Smith would
suffer considerable emotional harm if his child died, while Jane Doe
would suffer considerably less.155 She would not suffer stigma from

147. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 145, at 8–22.
148. See Father’s Rights at Issue, supra note 142; Savage, supra note 142 (discussing a husband’s
and wife’s competing interest in an unborn child, including the husband’s steady job).
149. See Father’s Rights at Issue, supra note 142.
150. See Brannigan, supra note 115, at 29.
151. See id.
152. See Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at 4, Smith v. Doe, 492 U.S. 919 (1988)
(No. 88-1837); see also Lewin, supra note 142 (noting that Jane Doe’s attorneys did not
present any evidence relating to paternity because they did not believe it was “a proper
subject for judicial review”).
153. See Abortion Case Sent to Lower Court, supra note 144; Lewin, supra note 142.
154. See Father’s Rights at Issue, supra note 142 (quoting Bopp’s description of Jane
Doe’s abortion reasoning process as “immature” and “frivolous”).
155. Lewin, supra note 142.
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unwed motherhood and would not face “a distressful life or future.”156
The only trauma she would face if the pregnancy came to term involved
her desire “to look nice in a bathing suit this summer, her desire not to
be pregnant in the summertime, and her desire not to share the
petitioner with the baby.”157
In opposing a subsequent petition to the United States Supreme
Court, Jane Doe outlined some of the costs of a balancing approach.158
Jane Doe expressed the humiliation she experienced after her
physician was subpoenaed, attorneys debated her mental health,
physical well-being, and sexual history, and her acquaintances testified
in open court about her sex life.159
While seeking expedited review from the Indiana Supreme Court,
Jane Doe ignored the judge’s order and terminated her pregnancy.160
Bopp and Coleson still asked the United States Supreme Court to
review the case,161 and both parties’ filings revealed deeply different
views about the promise of a balancing test in the abortion context.162
Working with attorneys from Indiana and the national ACLU
Reproductive Freedom Project, Jane Doe first argued that balancing
presented the same problems as state-mandated spousal
involvement.163 “Whether imposed by court order on a case-by-case
basis or by state statute, the deprivation of a woman’s constitutional
right is equally complete,” Jane Doe contended.164 Jane Doe reiterated
that “[e]very adult woman has the right to decide to have an abortion
and to effectuate that decision without government interference,
regardless of her very personal reasons or having to reveal those
reasons.”165 Forcing her to do otherwise, Jane Doe concluded,
suggested that she had no constitutional abortion right.166

156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See Respondent’s Brief, supra note 152, at 3–5.
159. See id.; see also Lewin, supra note 142 (noting that the judge’s intrusion into
Doe’s personal matters was particularly troublesome).
160. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 152, at 5; see also Lewin, supra note 142.
161. Lewin, supra note 142.
162. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 145; Respondent’s Brief, supra
note 152, at 3–5.
163. See Respondent’s Brief, supra note 152, at 7.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 8.
166. See id. at 7–8.
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Further, Jane Doe suggested that balancing in the reproductive
context was doomed from the start.167 Given the range of religious,
medical, and personal factors in play in decisions about reproduction,
judges applying a balancing test could too easily impose their “purely
subjective observations and personal beliefs.”168 If the Court disagreed,
courts would likely be flooded with “countless highly personal disputes
involving abortion, sterilization, and the use of birth control, between
spouses and lovers.”169 The very use of balancing might deter some
women from exercising their reproductive rights. Forcing a woman to
publicly defend her private decision to terminate her pregnancy might
tax her abortion right into non-existence.170
Bopp and Coleson’s petition for writ of certiorari made clear that
the adoption of a balancing test was intended to allow pro-lifers to chip
away at abortion rights.171 First, Bopp and Coleson argued that even if
the Constitution recognized an abortion right, it was not a strong
one—the interest could be overcome by a significant number of
government interests.172 Indeed, Bopp and Coleson contended that “a
state’s interest in protecting the interests of fathers in their unborn
children rise[s] to the level of being compelling.”173 As Bopp and
Coleson framed it, abortion was not a fundamental right for women;
women had a right to override fathers’ decisions only if they had
compelling enough reasons to do so.174 The lawyers’ petition for writ
of certiorari mentioned the following example: if because of
reproductive capacity, a man stood to lose his last chance of having a
genetic child, a woman should lose out if she had “relatively weaker
reasons” for choosing abortion, such as wanting a boy rather than a
girl.175 An individualized balancing analysis meant that women had to

167. See id. (asserting that “[c]ourts are ill-equipped to evaluate” all the factors
involved in the abortion decision).
168. Id. at 8.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 145, at 7–17 (arguing the state
has a compelling interest in protecting a man’s interest in his unborn child).
172. See id. at 7–10 (contending the right to abortion is not absolute and Danforth
did not preclude states from balancing paternal rights).
173. Id. at 10.
174. See id. at 6–12.
175. Id. at 14.
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deserve their abortion rights.176 Women who acted for the wrong
reasons would have few rights at all.177
Bopp and Coleson’s analysis of Smith’s case offered additional
insight into how a balancing test would apply. Bopp and Coleson
emphasized the intensity of a father’s interest in parenthood and
willingness to accept custody and complete financial responsibility for
having a child.178 The petition for writ of certiorari also described Jane
Doe’s reasons for choosing abortion as frivolous, such as an interest in
keeping herself free from responsibilities that would compromise her
ability to find a future romantic partner.179
The Supreme Court declined to take the case,180 but it was just the
first of many in the late 1980s that pro-lifers would bring using a
balancing test to erode women’s abortion rights.181 Abortion-rights
attorneys responded by arguing that cases like Danforth had settled the
matter.182 But despite any similarities between Danforth and the more
recent cases, those on both sides recognized that the make-up of the
Court had changed, and the outcome could be quite different with
President Reagan nominees on the bench.183
While Bopp and Coleson saw a balancing approach as an opening to
attack legal abortion immediately, the Court was not yet ready to
overrule Roe. In 1986, the Supreme Court issued its most recent
abortion decision, Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists.184 In Thornburgh, the Court struck down each part of a
challenged Pennsylvania statute and rebuked those who did not accept
that Roe was the law.185 However, four justices dissented, including
Chief Justice Warren Burger, one of the justices who had voted with

176. See id. at 5–14.
177. See id.
178. See id. at 14–16.
179. See id. at 15–17.
180. See Smith v. Doe, 492 U.S. 919 (1988) (denying certiorari).
181. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
182. See Respondent’s Brief, supra note 152, at 6–8.
183. For a discussion on pro-lifers’ hopes that Anthony Kennedy, the most recent
Supreme Court nominee at the time, would be the fifth vote to overrule Roe, see Dave
Andrusko, Pro-abortionists Unsure Whether to Appeal Decision Upholding Parent Notification
Law, NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS, Aug. 28, 1988, at 5.
184. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
185. See id. at 758–71 (emphasizing that “the constitutional principles that led this
Court to its decision in 1973 still provide compelling reason for recognizing the
constitutional dimensions of a woman’s right to decide whether to end her
pregnancy”).
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the majority in Roe.186 Several of the dissenters explicitly called for the
reexamination of Roe.187
The 1987 retirement of Lewis Powell made the overruling of Roe
more likely.188 Ronald Reagan quickly nominated Robert Bork, a judge
on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, to replace Powell.189 Bork’s nomination became one of the most
polarizing nominations in American history.190 A group of disparate,
left-leaning organizations formed the Block Bork Coalition to doom the
judge’s nomination.191 Bork had been an outspoken critic of Roe and
other substantive due process decisions, and had suggested that they
represented particularly egregious examples of judicial activism.192

186. See id. at 782–85 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 785–14 (White, J., dissenting);
id. at 814–25 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist joined in the dissents of
Justices White and O’Connor. See id. at 785 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 814
(O’Connor, J., dissenting).
187. See id. at 785 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“[W]e should reexamine Roe.”); id. at
788 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that Roe does not deserve the deference of stare
decisis because it “departs from a proper understanding of the Constitution”).
188. See, e.g., Glen Elsasser, Powell Quits Supreme Court, CHI. TRIB. (June 27, 1987),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1987-06-27-8702170248-story.html;
Stuart Taylor, Jr., Powell Leaves High Court; Took Key Role on Abortion and on Affirmative
Action, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 1987), https://www.nytimes.com/1987/06/27/us/powellleaves-high-court-took-key-role-on-abortion-and-on-affirmative-action.html.
189. See, e.g., LAURA COHEN BELL, WARRING FACTIONS: INTEREST GROUPS, MONEY, AND
THE NEW POLITICS OF SENATE CONFIRMATION 56 (2002) (discussing how Bork was
considered “extremely conservative” but generally respected by members of the
Senate); ALFRED S. REGNERY, UPSTREAM: THE ASCENDANCE OF AMERICAN CONSERVATISM
247 (2008) (examining the public’s reception to the news that President Reagan’s
intended to nominate Bork).
190. See, e.g., JOHN ANTHONY MALTESE, THE SELLING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES vii
(1995) (noting that over 300 liberal interest groups expressly protested Bork’s
nomination, while over 100 conservative interest groups supported his nomination);
SIDNEY M. MILKIS & MICHAEL NELSON, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT, 1776–2011 392 (6th ed. 2012) (characterizing Bork’s nomination as
“without parallel in the history of judicial nominations”); STEPHEN W. STATHIS,
LANDMARK DEBATES IN CONGRESS: FROM THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE TO THE
WAR IN IRAQ 445 (2009) (describing the “intense political battle” surrounding Bork’s
nomination and the “unprecedented role” that the media played in his confirmation).
191. See LANNY DAVIS, SCANDAL: HOW “GOTCHA” POLITICS IS DESTROYING AMERICA 110
(2006) (illustrating the Coalition’s grassroots methodology for attacking Bork’s
nomination); Neal Devins, Substantive Due Process, Public Opinion, and the “Right” to Die, in
THE REHNQUIST LEGACY 327, 335 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2006) (outlining the Coalition’s
method of attacking Bork’s opinion of privacy rights in order to discredit his nomination).
192. See, e.g., MARK GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION:
EQUAL CHOICE, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND REPRODUCTIVE POLITICS 24–25 (1996).
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In early October, Bork’s bid for the Court failed in committee.193
Although many expected the nominee to concede defeat, both Bork and
President Reagan called for a full Senate debate.194 Given that Democrats
controlled the Senate, the outcome of the final vote did not come as a
surprise: Bork’s nomination failed by a vote of 42–58.195 Bork’s hearings
started a new era of Supreme Court nominations; one marked by
increasing partisanship and high-stakes interest group spending.196
Reagan’s next nominee, Anthony Kennedy, a judge from the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, had no trouble in
Congress.197 By February 1988, the Senate voted unanimously to
confirm him.198 NRLC leaders obviously saw Kennedy, and other
Supreme Court nominees, as the linchpin of a bolder attack on Roe.199
“Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has described Roe v. Wade as being on a
collision course with itself,” wrote NRLC President John Willke.200
“Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy have not yet voted
directly on a law restricting abortion, . . . but [i]t is hoped that all three
will vote to overrule Roe v. Wade if and when the time comes.”201 As
important to their attack on Roe, George H.W. Bush, Reagan’s vice

193. See Edward Walsh & Al Kamen, Senate Panel Votes 9–5 to Reject Bork, WASH. POST
(Oct. 7, 1987), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1987/10/07/
senate-panel-votes-9-5-to-reject-bork/8369c6f2-1226-447c-8397-5c70fc2eda73.
194. See, e.g., Senate Rejects Bork, 58–42, Six Republicans Bolt Party Ranks to Oppose Judge,
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 23, 1987), http://articles.latimes.com/1987-10-23/news/mn10814_1_senate-rejects-bork (suggesting that Bork wanted the debate to be judged in
the future by a full record of the confirmation proceeding).
195. See id.
196. See DAMON ROOT, OVERRULED: THE LONG BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT 109 (2014); STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE
BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 169–70 (2008); MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE
REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 335–36 (2005).
197. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Senate, 97 to 0, Confirms Kennedy to High Court, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 4, 1988), https://www.nytimes.com/1988/02/04/us/senate-97-to-0confirms-kennedy-to-high-court.html; Al Kamen, Kennedy Confirmed, 97–0, WASH. POST
(Feb. 4, 1988), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/02/04/
kennedy-confirmed-97-0/6c29af9a-96d6-4902-97f4-daebf674e468; Al Kamen, Kennedy
Moves Court to Right; Justice More Conservative than Expected, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1989, at A1.
198. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
199. See, e.g., J. C. Willke, From the President’s Desk: Of Greatest Importance, NAT’L RIGHT
TO LIFE NEWS, Sept. 12, 1988, at 3 (1988 National Right to Life News Box, Dr. Joseph
Stanton Library, Sisters for Life Convent, Bronx, New York).
200. See id.
201. See id.
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president, won the 1988 election and pledged to continue nominating
judges like Bork.202
The stakes of a balancing approach became clearer when Bopp and
Coleson took the case of Erin Andrew Conn.203 Conn and his wife,
Jennifer, had a five-month old daughter, Crystal, but their marriage
was failing.204 Nineteen-year-old Jennifer, who had scheduled an
abortion to end her six-week pregnancy, told Erin that she was filing
for divorce.205 Bopp and Coleson brought suit, as they had in similar
fathers’ rights cases, to ask for an injunction to stop Jennifer from
ending her pregnancy.206
In Conn v. Conn,207 Bopp and Coleson offered more insight into what
a balancing test would require. The two suggested that such a test was
appropriate in the abortion context because both genetic mothers and
fathers had constitutional interests at stake in the dispute.208
Nonetheless, the two favored a balancing test because it suggested that
whatever interest women had in abortion, it was not a fundamental
right.209 “[T]his Court has demonstrated that a compelling interest is
not always necessary when rights and interests of the parties are at
stake,” Bopp and Coleson wrote.210 The two pointed to the Supreme
Court’s adoption of balancing in parental-involvement cases as
evidence that abortion was not a right in any traditional sense.211 The
Court had created “a scheme grounded in individual judicial
determination on a case by case basis of whether a minor’s abortion

202. For a discussion on Bush’s promises regarding the Court, see JAN CRAWFORD
GREENBERG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 85–88 (2007); JULIE NOVKOV, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE PRESIDENCY: STRUGGLES FOR SUPREMACY 8 (2013).
203. See Henry J. Reske, Court Rejects Man’s Abortion Appeal, UPI (Nov. 14, 1988), https://
www.upi.com/Archives/1988/11/14/Court-rejects-mans-abortion-appeal/5840615958570.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8–30, Conn v. Conn, 488 U.S. 955 (1988)
(No. 88-347), 1988 WL 1093818.
207. 525 N.E.2d 612 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988), aff’d, 526 N.E.2d 958 (Ind. 1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 955 (1988).
208. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 206, at 15–21 (arguing that a
father has a constitutional right and interest in procreation, a biological relationship
with the unborn child, and his status in the family relationship).
209. See id. at 22–26 (asserting that a father’s interest in the unborn child is
sufficient to limit a woman’s ability to terminate a pregnancy).
210. Id. at 24.
211. See id. at 24–25 (citing to Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622 (1979)).
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should be authorized or precluded.”212 Bopp and Coleson believed
that by adopting a balancing test, the trial court signaled its willingness
to retreat from protecting abortion rights.213
The Supreme Court declined to hear Conn, but the push for men’s
rights in abortion continued.214 In 1989, the Supreme Court decided
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.215 In Webster, the Court upheld a
Missouri anti-abortion law, and a plurality of the Justices suggested that
Roe’s trimester framework was no longer tenable.216 In the aftermath,
pro-lifers looked for a vehicle for ending legal abortion, and balancing
approaches took a back seat to more aggressive alternatives.217 NRLC
promoted a model law which claimed to ban abortion as a form of
“birth control”; the law allowed abortions only in cases of rape, incest,
or a threat to a woman’s life or health.218
In 1992, the Court again weighed men’s rights in Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.219 Casey involved a multi-part

212. Id. at 25.
213. See id. at 25–26.
214. See Conn v. Conn, 488 U.S. 955 (1998) (mem.) (denying petition for writ of
certiorari from the Supreme Court of Indiana); see also Glen Elsasser, Court Won’t Hear
Father’s Abortion Appeal, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 15, 1988), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1
988-11-15/news/8802160348_1_abortion-decision-abortion-dispute-fetal-rights; Al Kamen,
Court:
Husband Can’t Veto Abortions, WASH. POST (Nov. 15, 1988),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/11/15/court-husband-cant-vet
o-abortion/a61f1003-2c64-4b1f-a728-064dc5ef675c.
215. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
216. See id. at 518–20 (Rehnquist, C.J.).
217. On the efforts pursued by pro-lifers to overrule Roe after Webster, see Timothy
Egan, Anti-Abortion Bill in Idaho Takes Aim at Landmark Case, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 1990),
https://www.nytimes.com/1990/03/22/us/anti-abortion-bill-in-idaho-takes-aim-at-land
mark-case.html; Idaho House OKs Stiffest Abortion Curbs in Nation, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 10,
1990), http://articles.latimes.com/1990-03-10/news/mn-1791_1_abortion-law.
On
NRLC’s investment in similar laws, see Paul Houston, Abortion Opponents to Press States to
Pass Wide-Ranging Curbs, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 3, 1989), http://articles.latimes.com/1989-1003/news/mn-579_1_abortion-opponents; Idaho’s Strict Abortion Bill Advances, L.A. TIMES
(Mar. 17, 1990), http://articles.latimes.com/1990-03-17/news/mn-210_1_abortion-bill;
Tamar Lewin, States Testing the Limits on Abortion, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 1990),
https://www.nytimes.com/1990/04/02/us/states-testing-the-limits-on-abortion.html.
218. See Egan, supra note 217; Houston, supra note 217; Lewin, supra note 217. Prolifers also took note when the territory of Guam passed a law banning most abortions.
On Guam’s law, see Jane Gross, Guam Approves Bill Posing Challenge to Abortion Ruling,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 1990), https://www.nytimes.com/1990/03/16/us/guamapproves-bill-posing-a-challenge-to-abortion-ruling.html; Guam Oks Restrictive Abortion
Bill, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 16, 1990, at D5.
219. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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Pennsylvania law that included a spousal-notification requirement.220
Pennsylvania made it illegal for a doctor to perform an abortion
without first receiving a signed written statement from a woman that
she had notified her husband about the abortion.221 A woman further
had the option of furnishing an alternative written statement, indicating:
that her husband is not the man who impregnated her; that her
husband could not be located; that the pregnancy is the result of
spousal sexual assault which she has reported; or that the woman
believes that notifying her husband will cause him or someone else
to inflict bodily injury upon her.222

The Casey Court famously refused to overrule Roe.223 The Court did,
however, upend the doctrinal framework that applied to abortion
law.224 Casey reasoned that because the government’s interest in
protecting fetal life applied throughout pregnancy, Roe’s trimester
framework was fatally flawed.225 As an alternative, the Court adopted
the undue burden standard, which asks whether a law has the purpose
or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion.226
In Casey, the Court applied the undue burden test and struck down
Canvassing scholarly
Pennsylvania’s spousal-notification law.227
research and studying the trial court’s findings of fact, the Court
reasoned that most women who refused to tell their husbands did so
for valid reasons, including the threat of domestic violence.228
Furthermore, the Court did not think that the exceptions written into
the Pennsylvania statute made a difference.229 As the Court saw it,
domestic violence victims would often be deterred from seeking an

220. See id. at 844.
221. See id. at 887.
222. Id.
223. See id. at 845–46 (“[T]he essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained
and once again reaffirmed.”).
224. See id. at 870–73 (rejecting Roe’s trimester framework and adopting a viability rationale).
225. See id. at 872–73 (recognizing that a state’s interest in protecting the unborn,
“even in the earliest stages of pregnancy,” allows the state to enact laws “to ensure that
[a woman’s] choice is thoughtful and informed”).
226. See id. at 876–78 (“In our view, the undue burden standard is the appropriate means of
reconciling the State’s interest with the woman’s constitutionally protected liberty.”).
227. Id. at 893–95.
228. Id. at 888–93.
229. See id. at 893.
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abortion by the notification requirement.230 In cases of sexual assault,
the exception seemed especially useless: many victims of sexual assault
would fail to meet reporting requirements, especially if their husbands
were notified that an investigation was taking place.231 “Section 3209
embodies a view of marriage consonant with the common-law status of
married women but repugnant to our present understanding of
marriage and of the nature of the rights secured by the Constitution,”
the Court explained.232 “Women do not lose their constitutionally
protected liberty when they marry.”233
The Court’s rejection of the spousal-notification law was especially
striking given the Justices’ willingness to uphold every other part of the
disputed law.234 For example, the Court upheld the statute’s medical
emergency provision, which did not allow for abortion for certain
serious health conditions, including “eclampsia, inevitable abortion,
and premature ruptured membrane.”235 Casey certainly did not close
the door on new abortion restrictions,236 but it seemed unwise for
abortion foes to focus on men’s rights or the kind of balancing
approach that Bopp and Coleson had used.
Just the same, the use of balancing tests in the abortion context tell
a cautionary tale. Bopp and Coleson gravitated toward a balancing test
because they believed that such an approach implied that women did
not have a fundamental abortion right.237 Similarly, in cases involving
ART, where important constitutional interests are likely in play, a
balancing approach seems to be in tension with the possible future
recognition of any procreative right. As Bopp and Coleson recognized,
230. See id. at 893–94 (“The spousal notification requirement . . . does not merely
make abortions a little more difficult or expensive to obtain; for many women, it will
impose a substantial obstacle.”).
231. See id. at 893 (observing that the sexual assault exemption required women to
notify law enforcement of the assault within ninety days).
232. Id. at 898.
233. Id.
234. See id. at 880 (definition of medical emergency); id. at 882–83 (providing state
published materials); id. at 886 (twenty-four hour waiting period); id. at 887 (informed
consent); id. at 899 (parental consent for minors seeking abortion); id. at 901
(recordkeeping and reporting requirements).
235. Id. at 880 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3203, 3205(a), 3206(a), 3209(c) (1990)).
236. Katherine Q. Seelye, Abortion Vote Signals a Shift in Political Momentum, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 23, 1997), https://www.nytimes.com/1997/03/23/us/abortion-votesignals-a-shift-in-political-momentum.html; Abby Goodnough, Trenton Bill Would
Require Abortion Wait, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 1888), https://www.nytimes.com/
1998/01/29/nyregion/trenton-bill-would-require-abortion-wait.html.
237. See supra notes 209–213 and accompanying text.
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balancing analyses implied that a number of interests could outweigh
whatever liberty women have.238
Courts are still grappling with how the Constitution applies in
assisted-reproduction cases.
Case law on the subject sends
contradictory messages about whether there is a fundamental right to
seek or avoid procreation.239 By focusing so much on the facts of
individual cases, courts have not consistently explained the nature of
either right or the relationship between them.240 Because of these
unpredictable results, it is difficult for parties using ART to know ahead
of time how an embryo-disposition suit will end. By finding that other
interests outweigh an interest in seeking or avoiding procreation,
courts can also suggest that there is no right to seek or avoid genetic
parenthood. Judges should not weigh in on these crucial constitutional
questions without more careful consideration and briefing of the issues.
As important, Bopp and Coleson preferred a balancing test because
it encouraged judges to zero in on individual’s reasons for seeking or
avoiding parenthood. By sifting through the most intimate details of
people’s lives, judges would certainly reach unpredictable results, and
the door might remain open for decisions forcing a woman to carry a
pregnancy to term. The same invasiveness and prejudice can easily
characterize balancing in the context of ART.
B.

Whole Woman’s Health and Balancing

More than two decades after Casey, a balancing approach was once
again at the center of abortion law. In Whole Woman’s Health, the Court
also addressed what Casey’s undue burden standard required.241 The
Court ultimately answered this question by laying out a balancing
analysis required by the undue burden test.242 This Article next
examines how Whole Woman’s Health adopted such an approach, how
the lower courts have applied it, and what the uses of balancing reveal
238. See supra notes 209–213 and accompanying text.
239. See Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *2–3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995)
(explaining that, as with abortion, ART does not provide fathers with additional rights
to compel or avoid procreation), rev’d, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997), aff’d,
696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998). But see Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992)
(stating that “a right to procreational autonomy is inherent in our most basic concepts
of liberty” and is made up of two equal parts—“the right to procreate and the right to
avoid procreation”).
240. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text.
241. See 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016) (articulating that Casey requires courts to balance
“the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those laws confer”).
242. See id.
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about its limitations. Whole Woman’s Health concerned two parts of
Texas’s H.B. 2 (HB2).243 One provision required abortion doctors to
have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles.244 The
second provision mandated that abortion clinics comply with state
regulations governing ambulatory surgical centers (ASCs) even if a
clinic relied on medication abortion.245
The impact of HB2 seemed likely to be profound. Most providers
did not have, and likely could not get, admitting privileges because,
among other reasons, not enough women went to the hospital after an
abortion to meet threshold admitting requirements.246 For many
clinics, the ASC requirements, especially those demanding the
overhaul of clinic facilities, would be prohibitively expensive.247 Data
suggested that it would cost clinics $1 million to comply with the ASC
regulations; it would be three times more to build a new facility.248
Abortion providers first challenged only the admitting privileges
law.249 While the district court held that the requirement created an
undue burden, the Fifth Circuit reversed.250 Shortly after, abortion
providers returned to court, this time challenging the ASC regulation
and arguing that the admitting privileges mandate was
unconstitutional as applied to clinics in McAllen and El Paso.251 The
district court again sided with Whole Woman’s Health,252 and the Fifth
Circuit reversed a second time.253 In part, the Fifth Circuit relied on
the doctrine of res judicata, emphasizing that providers could have
raised the same challenges during their original lawsuit.254 The court
further offered its perspective on what the undue burden standard
243. Id. at 2300.
244. See id. (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0031(a) (West 2013)).
245. See id. (citing § 245.010(a)).
246. See id. at 2312.
247. Id. at 2314–16 (explaining that the surgical center requirements would reduce
the number of abortion facilities in Texas to only seven or eight).
248. Brief for Petitioners at 6–7, Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, (U.S.) (No. 15274), 2015 WL 9592289.
249. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300 (citing Planned Parenthood of Greater
Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 951 F. Supp. 2d 891, 901 (W.D. Tex. 2013)).
250. Id. at 2300–01 (citing Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health
Servs. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583, 592 (5th Cir. 2014)).
251. Id. at 2301; see also Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 678
(W.D. Tex. 2014).
252. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2303 (citing to Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 687).
253. Id. (citing Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 2015)
(per curiam)).
254. See id. (explaining the Fifth Circuit’s rationale for reversing the district court).
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required.255 The court first applied a rational basis test, then asked
whether the law unduly burdened a woman’s abortion decision.256
When the Supreme Court took the case, those on both sides
disputed what the undue burden standard required.257 Representing
Whole Woman’s Health, the Center for Reproductive Rights (the
Center) insisted that “[t]he undue burden standard strikes a careful
balance between a woman’s liberty to make decisions about
childbearing . . . with ‘the State’s profound interest in potential
life.’”258 The Center argued that the courts had to weigh “the severity
of the obstacle relative to the strength of the state’s interest in
imposing it.”259 To determine the purpose of the law, as the Center
saw it, the Court should not blindly accept legislators’ account of what
they were doing.260 Instead, the Court would have to evaluate whether
a law reasonably advanced its stated end.261
The Center argued that the decrease in abortion access would have
an impermissible effect, “increasing the wait time for appointments at
abortion facilities and the distances that many women would have to
travel to reach those facilities.”262 Insisting that these effects had to be
weighed against the health benefits (or lack thereof) created by the Texas
law, the Center argued that HB2 unduly burdened women’s rights.263
Texas read the undue burden standard quite differently.264 Rather
than evaluating the strength of the government’s purpose, the Court,
255. See id. (noting the Fifth Circuit’s undue burden standard found a statute
constitutional if “(1) it does not have the purpose or effect of placing a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus; and (2) it is
reasonably related to (or designed to further) a legitimate state interest” (quoting Cole,
790 F.3d at 572)).
256. Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 769 F.3d 285, 293 (5th Cir. 2014) (staying
the district court’s second injunction against the two HB2 provisions at issue).
257. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 248, at 2 (“Under no circumstances . . . may
a state enact ‘[u]nnecessary health regulations that have the purpose or effect of
presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion.” (quoting Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992))); Brief for Respondents at
15, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt (U.S.) (No. 15-274), 2016 WL 344496 (“The
undue burden test analyzes the degree of an abortion law’s burden to determine
whether it imposes a substantial obstacle to abortion access; it does not reweigh the
medical justifications for a law by balancing them against the law’s burdens”).
258. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 248, at 44 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 878).
259. Id. at 45.
260. See id. at 47.
261. See id.
262. Id. at 49.
263. See id.
264. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 257, at 20.
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as Texas saw it, should recognize that “[c]onstitutional analysis of a
statute’s purpose is highly deferential.”265 The fact that lawmakers
knew or should know that HB2 would close clinics did not change the
analysis.266 “In any industry, businesses that do not meet governing
regulations may not be able to operate, and a legislature may be well
aware of that fact,” Texas reasoned.267 “But that does not prove a
legislative purpose to produce whatever effects may flow from closing
a business, rather than to achieve the public-welfare benefits of the
regulations.”268 Furthermore, Texas argued that the law would have
little effect, as most women would still live near metropolitan areas with
an abortion clinic.269
In June 2016, a short-handed Court handed down a five-to-three
decision adopting a balancing analysis similar to the one the Center
proposed.270 After holding that res judicata did not bar the petitioners’
challenge, the Court turned to the meaning of the undue burden
standard.271 The Court first clarified that Casey required “that courts
consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with
the benefits those laws confer.”272 How would this analysis work? The
Court offered little guidance but referred to two provisions analyzed
by Casey: the parental-notification law upheld in that case and the
spousal-notification measure struck down by the Court.273 In both of
these cases, as the Court in Whole Woman’s Health explained, the Court
performed a “balancing.”274
The Court further clarified what kind of evidence would factor into
the balance Casey commanded.275 Texas argued that under the Court’s
earlier decisions, lower courts should defer to lawmakers’ assessments
of contested scientific evidence.276 Thus, although the Court should

265. Id. at 31.
266. See id. at 42.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. See id. at 45.
270. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309–10 (2016)
(concluding that the district court applied the correct standard while the Fifth Circuit
did not). Whole Woman’s Health was argued and decided after the death of Justice Scalia.
271. Id. at 2309.
272. Id.
273. See id.
274. Id.
275. See id. at 2310.
276. See id. at 2309–10 (rejecting the undue standard applied by the Court of
Appeals that relied on Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), which upheld the
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defer to Texas legislators’ conclusion that HB2 would protect women’s
health,277 it rejected this argument.278 Instead, it held that courts
performing a balancing test should place the most “weight upon
evidence and argument presented in judicial proceedings.”279
The Court’s application of the balancing test offered additional
guidance.280 The Court stressed that the record contained no evidence
that the admitting privileges provision solved a problem.281 The Court
in Whole Woman’s Health reasoned that the complication rate for
abortion was low, that even fewer complications resulted in
hospitalization, and that more serious complications did not become
apparent at the clinic when admitting privileges would come into
play.282 The Court further measured the benefit achieved by the
admitting privilege law as compared to the measures that were
previously in place.283 The Court in Whole Woman’s Health performed a
similar analysis of the ASC provision.284
The Court weighed the burdens created by the admitting privilege
and ASC provisions of HB2 against their lack of achieved benefits.285
The Court in Whole Woman’s Health reasoned that there was enough
evidence supporting the district court’s conclusion that the facilities
that could comply with HB2 could not meet the demand created by
federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act); Brief for Respondents, supra note 257, at 16
(“As Gonzales held, where the medical evidence is in dispute, legislatures have ‘wide
discretion’ to enact medical regulations . . . . Gonzales does not permit a district court
to choose one version of the disputed medical evidence, under the guise of making
witness-credibility determinations, and use that disputed view to find abortion laws
unconstitutional.” (citations omitted)).
277. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2310; Brief for Respondents, supra note
257, at 26 (arguing that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals correctly applied Gonzales
by deferring to legislative judgment).
278. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2310 (“[I]n Gonzales the Court, while
pointing out that we must review legislative ‘fact-finding under a deferential standard,’
added that we must not ‘place dispositive weight’ on those ‘findings.’” (quoting
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 165)).
279. Id.
280. See generally id. at 2310–18 (applying the balancing test to the challenged
provisions of the Texas statute).
281. See id. at 2311 (finding that, although the provision was enacted to ensure “easy
access to a hospital” in the event of complications during an abortion procedure,
“nothing in Texas’ record evidence . . . shows that . . . the new law advanced Texas’s
legitimate interest in protecting women’s health”).
282. See id. (discussing the evidence and expert testimony in the record).
283. Id. at 2311–12.
284. Id. at 2314–18.
285. Id. at 2310–18.
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the number of clinics HB2 would force to close.286 The Court further
reasoned that given the lack of benefit delivered by the law, other
burdens were also constitutionally cognizable.287 The Court noted that
if HB2 went into effect, women would be “less likely to get the kind of
individualized attention, serious conversation, and emotional support
that doctors at less taxed facilities may have offered.”288
At first, Whole Woman’s Health may seem to cast balancing approaches
in a positive light. After all, the Court used a balancing analysis to put
real teeth in the undue burden standard and strengthen protections
for abortion rights.289 In the context of ART, it seems possible to use a
balancing analysis to protect emerging constitutional interests in
seeking or avoiding parenthood. Whole Woman’s Health also appears to
offer solid guidance about how balancing should proceed.
However, the lower courts’ application of Whole Woman’s Health
should create concern for those who hope to use a balancing test to
sort out the competing interests at stake in embryo-disposition cases.
This Section next explores these efforts to apply Whole Woman’s Health.
C. Knowing What to Balance:
The Aftermath of Whole Woman’s Health
Since the Court decided Whole Woman’s Health, lower courts have
grappled with exactly how the Court’s balancing analysis fits in existing
abortion jurisprudence. The case law created in the aftermath of Whole
Woman’s Health should give us pause.
For example, several courts have dealt with laws similar to HB2’s
admitting privileges requirement.290 Some of these cases address laws
virtually identical to HB2 that required admitting privileges at a
hospital within thirty miles of a clinic.291 Others vary slightly, such as
286. Id. at 2316–18.
287. Id. at 2318.
288. Id.
289. See id. at 2310.
290. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Ark. & E. Okla. v. Jegley, 864 F.3d 953, 955–56
(8th Cir. 2017); Hopkins v. Jegley, 267 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1033–34 (E.D. Ark. 2017),
appeal filed, No. 17-2879 (8th Cir. Aug. 28, 2017); June Med. Servs. LLC v. Kliebert, 250
F. Supp. 3d 27, 33 (M.D. La. 2017), rev’d by June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, No. 1730397, 2018 WL 4611031 (5th Cir. Sept. 26, 2018).
291. See, e.g., Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 53–54 (“Act 620 provides that every
physician who performs or induces an abortion shall ‘have active admitting privileges
at a hospital that is located no further than thirty miles from the location at which the
abortion is performed or induced . . . .’” (quoting LA. STAT. ANN. § 1061.10(A)(2)(a)
(2016), formerly LA. REV. STAT. § 40.1299.35.2A(1) (2014))).
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Arkansas’s requirement that abortion providers contract with a
physician or hospital that can deal with any ensuing complications.292
The results in these cases showcase the difficulty of understanding—
and applying—a balancing analysis consistently when the facts (and
courts’ views of the constitutional stakes) vary. Consider the clashing
results reached by the district court and the Eighth Circuit when
evaluating the Arkansas Abortion-Inducing Drug Safety Act.293 This
law requires any physician dispensing medical abortion to have a
contract with a physician dedicated to handling emergencies.294 That
physician, in turn, must have “active admitting, gynecological/surgical
privileges at a hospital designated to handle any emergencies
associated with . . . an abortion-inducing drug.”295
Relying on Whole Woman’s Health, Planned Parenthood of Arkansas
and Eastern Oklahoma challenged the constitutionality of the law.296
In applying Whole Woman’s Health’s balancing test, the district court
first considered whether the law added any benefit when compared to
the protocols that Planned Parenthood already had in place.297
Arkansas claimed that the law guaranteed continuity of care for
women, thereby improving health outcomes.298 In evaluating this
argument, the district court focused on the language of the statute,
noting that Arkansas did not require the physician addressing
complications to have a prior relationship with a patient, accompany
her to the hospital, or otherwise guarantee continuity of care.299
The court also reasoned that the law did not guarantee more
continuity of care than did Planned Parenthood’s protocols.300
292. See, e.g., Jegley, 864 F.3d at 955–56 (examining the constitutionality of
Arkansas’s Abortion-Inducing Drugs Safety Act, which requires that the “physician who
gives, sells, dispenses, administers, or otherwise provides or prescribes the abortioninducing drug shall have a signed contract with a physician who agrees to handle
complications” (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-1504(d)(1) (2014))).
293. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-16-1501–1510. Compare Jegley, 864 F.3d at 958–60
(prioritizing safety concerns over potential burdens), with Planned Parenthood of Ark.
& E. Okla. V. Jegley, No. 4:15-cv-00784-KGB, 2016 WL 6211310, at *29–32 (E.D. Ark.
Mar. 14, 2016) (finding that the burdens outweighed the benefits given the existing
protections in place).
294. See § 20-16-1504(d)(1).
295. § 20-16-1504(d)(2).
296. See Jegley, 2016 WL 6211310, at *12–13.
297. See id. at *18, *20, *25 (analyzing the benefits of the contracted physician and
final printed label requirements of the Arkansas law).
298. Id. at *15.
299. See id. at *16.
300. See id.
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Because abortion was relatively safe, women rarely reported
complications; and, Planned Parenthood instructed patients to call
When the
Planned Parenthood’s twenty-four-hour helpline.301
circumstances demanded it, Planned Parenthood also referred
patients to emergency facilities, communicated with hospital staff, and
arranged for follow-up care.302 Because Planned Parenthood took
extensive precautions to address complications, and because there did
not seem to be any problem in the first place, the court found that the
Arkansas statute was a “solution in search of a problem.”303
When it came to the effect of the law, the court observed that
Planned Parenthood had not been able to contract with a physician
and would be unable to do so in the future.304 If the contracted
physician provision went into effect, as the court explained, only one
clinic would continue providing abortions in the state and all of them
which would be surgical.305 As the court saw it, the burdens of
Arkansas’s law outweighed the benefits.306
However, the Eighth Circuit reversed, seeing Whole Woman’s Health’s
balancing analysis quite differently.307 The court’s analysis turned on
the meaning of Casey’s large-fraction test, under which the plaintiff can
prevail by demonstrating that “in a large fraction of the cases in which
[the law] is relevant, it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a
woman’s choice to undergo an abortion.”308 The Court in Whole Woman’s
Health clarified that the large-fraction test applied to women “for whom
[the provision] is an actual rather than irrelevant restriction.”309
The district court had zeroed in on women affected by the law,310 but
as the Eighth Circuit saw it, the district court abused its discretion by
failing to estimate a specific number of women who would be burdened

301. See id. at *17.
302. See id.
303. Id. at *18.
304. See id. at *29.
305. See id. at *30.
306. See id. at *30–31.
307. See Planned Parenthood of Ark. & E. Okla. v. Jegley, 864 F.3d 953, 958–60 (8th
Cir. 2017).
308. Id. at 958 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992)).
309. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2320 (2016).
310. See Jegley, 2016 WL 6211310, at *4, *7–8 (finding evidence that the
requirements would increase travel and costs for women, which could force them to
seek abortions later and would therefore require riskier surgical abortions rather than
medication abortions).
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by the Arkansas law.311 Although insisting that the district court did not
need to calculate the exact number of women who would have to
postpone or forego abortions, the court demanded more specificity.312
The Eighth Circuit also suggested that Planned Parenthood needed
to do more to show that existing facilities could not expand to meet
increased patient demand.313 The court further questioned whether even
under Whole Woman’s Health, increased wait times, crowding, and lower
quality of care would count as a burden in the first place.314 Whereas the
lack of a health benefit was decisive in Whole Woman’s Health, the benefit,
or lack thereof, played no part in the Eighth Circuit’s analysis.315
The Eighth Circuit’s approach stood in tension with that of other
courts considering admitting privilege statutes. Consider June Medical
Services LLC v. Kliebert,316 a Louisiana case involving another law similar
to HB2.317 Louisiana “Act 620” mandates that abortion performing
physicians have “active admitting privileges at a hospital that is located
not further than thirty miles from the location at which the abortion is
performed . . . and that provides obstetrical or gynecological health
care services.”318 The district court enjoined enforcement of the law,
stressing that Louisiana lacked any evidence demonstrating that
abortion clinics improperly treated abortion or that admitting
privileges would prevent any negative outcomes.319 The court
estimated that 10,000 women sought abortions in Louisiana.320 If the
311. See Jegley, 864 F.3d at 958–60 (acknowledging that the district court correctly
narrowed the affected population to “women seeking medication abortions in Arkansas”
but had abused its discretion in failing to determine how many woman who would face
“increased travel distances,” “would forgo abortions,” or “postpone their abortions”).
312. See id. at 960.
313. See id. at 959 (noting that the record did not provide evidence that the
remaining facilities would be unable to “absorb” a higher demand for services if
Planned Parenthood had to close).
314. See id. (suggesting that, since the Supreme Court relied on Gonzales in the
Hellerstedt ruling, state and federal legislatures still had “wide discretion to pass
legislation in areas where there is medical and scientific uncertainty” (quoting
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007))).
315. See id. at 960 (remanding on the grounds that the district court record noted
“no concrete . . . findings” that a large fraction of women would be unduly burdened
by the Arkansas requirements).
316. 250 F. Supp. 3d. 27 (M.D. La. 2017), rev’d by June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee,
905 F.3d 787 (5th Cir. 2018).
317. See Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 53–54 (analyzing the constitutionality of
Louisiana’s Unsafe Abortion Protection Act, LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1601.10 (2014)).
318. LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1601.10(A)(2)(a).
319. Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 86–87.
320. See id. at 87.
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law went into effect, only one provider would remain.321 The court
concluded that there was no way for this doctor, who currently
performed fewer than 3000 abortions a year, to meet the demand that
would be created by the law.322 Based on these findings, the court
reasoned that the number of self-induced abortions would increase
and women would face delays, increased travel distances, and a lower
quality of care.323 The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court in June
Medical Services L.L.C. v. Gee,324 insisting that the Louisiana law differed
from the one in Whole Woman’s Health.325 Because the law would result
in fewer clinic closures and because the Fifth Circuit found evidence
that Louisiana’s law would benefit women, the court distinguished it
from Whole Woman’s Health.326
It is possible to distinguish the laws analyzed in these cases: for
example, the Arkansas law did not specify a distance to a hospital at
which a doctor had admitting privileges.327 In theory, the Supreme
Court could resolve any ambiguities in how the Whole Woman’s Health
balancing approach should apply. The Court could explain how
precise a lower court needs to be in its estimate of the number of
women affected by a law or how important it is that a law does not seem
to address a grave problem.
Without such guidance, the Court’s balancing approach invites the
kind of inconsistency that now characterizes the lower courts’
decisions. In Whole Woman’s Health, the court took an approach that is
inherently open-ended and fact-intensive. Under such an approach,
lower courts are able to uphold laws that look almost exactly the same
as the one struck down in Whole Woman’s Health by simply
distinguishing the facts of the case. The Eighth Circuit suggested that
Arkansas’s contracted-physician requirement might impact a relatively
smaller number of women than HB2.328 The court further suggested
321. See id.
322. See id.
323. See id. at 66, 89.
324. 905 F.3d 787 (5th Cir. 2018).
325. Id. at 815.
326. Id. at 811.
327. Compare Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 31–36, 47 (finding a statute that requires
hospital admitting privileges by physicians performing abortions to be an undue
burden on women), with Planned Parenthood of Ark. & E. Okla. v. Jegley, 864 F.3d
953, 957–58 (8th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (holding that a statute requiring hospital
admitting privileges to be constitutional since plaintiffs failed to prove a large fraction
of women seeking abortions were burdened).
328. See Jegley, 864 F.3d at 957–59.
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that the burdens stressed in HB2—including increased travel distances,
waiting times, or a lower quality of care—mattered because of the facts
of that case rather than because of any generalizable principle.329
Moreover, courts have reacted differently to Whole Woman’s Health’s
conclusion that abortion is safe and that admitting privilege
requirements do not address a real problem.330 For some courts, a law
delivering no benefit cannot justifiably benefit women even if the
burdens remain hard to quantify precisely.331 For the Eighth Circuit,
by contrast, the burden is paramount.332 Even if the Arkansas
Abortion-Inducing Drug Safety Act did almost nothing for women, it
would be constitutional so long as it did not burden a sufficiently large
number of women.333
The aftermath of Whole Woman’s Health highlights additional
problems with a balancing approach. When it comes to politicallycharged issues like embryo disposition or abortion, courts will almost
inevitably view the facts differently. Balancing approaches invite
discordant results. In the abortion context, for example, courts can
disagree about the degree of the benefit or burden created by a law
and the relative importance of the advantages and disadvantages of a
law. Courts can also reach conflicting results when the evidence is—
or is claimed to be—contested, resolving medical or factually uncertain
questions in disparate ways. Something similar can easily take place in
the ART context. Courts can disagree about the relative importance
of competing interests in seeking and avoiding procreation and the
hierarchy of procreative rights. When there are medical questions
about the prospects of future fertility or ideological questions about
the comparability of adoption, courts can also reach strikingly
different outcomes.
In the ART context, this uncertainty is especially disturbing. As the
Supreme Court recognized in Casey, women have ordered their lives

329. See id.
330. Compare Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 48–50 (requiring admitting privileges
provided no benefit that would outweigh the burden on women seeking abortion), with
Jegley, 864 F.3d at 960 (holding that requiring admitting privileges was constitutional
because the benefit to the safety of women outweighed the potential burden).
331. See, e.g., Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 88–89 (“Any marginal health benefits would
be dramatically outweighed by the obstacles the restriction erects to women’s access to
their constitutional right to abortion.”).
332. See Jegley, 864 F.3d at 957–58.
333. See id. at 960.
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around the availability of legal abortion.334 The legal uncertainty that
is so obvious in the aftermath of Whole Woman’s Health makes it harder
for women to know when and if abortion will be available. Inconsistent
results can have an even greater chilling effect. Couples using ART
undergo a time-consuming procedure like IVF to procreate, and often
they complete extensive paperwork addressing their options after
embryos are created.335 With an uncertain balancing test in place,
those using ART have no way of knowing ex ante how a court will view
the soundness of the documents governing embryo disposition or the
facts of a particular case. While ART holds out the possibility of wellplanned, deliberate reproduction, balancing approaches show that any
such promise is hollow.
By looking at the history evaluated here, Part III closely examines
the problems with leading approaches to embryo-disposition disputes.
Part III then proposes a solution that should lead to more predictable,
fair, and constitutionally sound outcomes in embryo-disposition suits.
III. BEYOND BALANCING
Most courts addressing embryo-disposition cases conclude that it
would be better if the parties reached their own decision about what
to do. For this reason, the majority of courts that follow the court’s
approach in Kass and look for an appropriate contract to resolve
embryo-disposition suits.336 Even the mutual, contemporaneous
agreement strategy adopted in Witten demands an agreement on the
part of those contesting embryo disposition.337 In practice, however,
an adequate contract is hard to come by. Most of those who use IVF,
like Vergara and Loeb, at most, sign forms that address disputes

334. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 853–57 (1992)
(“[F]or two decades of economic and social developments, people have organized
intimate relationships and made choices that define their views of themselves and their
places in society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that
contraception should fail.”).
335. See, e.g., Forman, supra note 5, at 61–89 (detailing the situation for many fertility
patients of facing a “thick packet” of consent forms before beginning treatment).
336. See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 174 (N.Y. 1998) (applying a balancing
approach if no valid disposition contract can be found).
337. See In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 781–82 (Iowa 2003) (holding
that state enforcement of a prior agreement after one of the parties changed their
mind about their reproductive choice was against public policy).
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between patients and fertility clinics.338 Some have no written
agreement at all.339 Lacking a convincing agreement, courts often fall
back on a balancing analysis.340
The history of balancing in the abortion context illuminates some of
the problems that will arise if courts continue to follow a similar
approach in embryo-disposition suits. First, a balancing analysis makes
it harder for courts to get right the tricky constitutional questions that
will inevitably come up in embryo-disposition suits. Judges applying
balancing tests could send the message that the right to abortion is not
truly fundamental.341 By siding with a father, courts would send the
message that many men have personal circumstances that could
outweigh any liberty interest in abortion that the Constitution
recognizes.342 As important, a balancing test tends to generate quite
different results in different jurisdictions, sending conflicting messages
about the relative strengths of someone’s interest in seeking or
avoiding procreation.343
ART has started a series of crucially important debates about the
relationship between constitutional law and reproduction.344 The
Supreme Court’s case law on abortion and contraception suggests that
the Constitution recognizes rights to seek and avoid procreation,345 but
related constitutional questions have no clear answer. Does the
Constitution just recognize a right to terminate a pregnancy or use
contraception? Is there a broader right to seek parenthood? What
kind of parenthood: functional, gestational, or genetic? Does a right
to seek parenthood outweigh the right to avoid parenthood?

338. See, e.g., Forman, supra note 5, at 83, 86 (“[C]linics provide the forms and their
primary purpose is to provide written documentation of the patients’ informed
consent and thereby protect the physician from liability.”).
339. See id. at 61.
340. See supra notes 58–64 and accompanying text (detailing why many courts
continue to use the balancing analysis in fertility cases, despite ongoing criticisms).
341. See supra notes 132–133 and accompanying text (explaining that some scholars
support the use of the balancing test since it implies that women do not have a
fundamental abortion right).
342. See supra notes 142–157 and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 291–297 and accompanying text.
344. See Ziegler, supra note 36, at 1263–70.
345. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309–11 (2016);
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870–77 (1992); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453–55 (1972); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965).
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These are significant questions, and balancing approaches send a
puzzling message about these constitutional issues. Courts have
reached conflicting results in these cases. In some instances, courts
have held that one party’s interest in avoiding parenthood outweighs
another’s desire to seek parenthood.346 Others have sided with the
party seeking parenthood if the use of embryos represents someone’s
last procreative chance.347 The constitutional dimensions of embryodisposition questions remain obscure. State courts have just begun to
illuminate the boundaries and relative strength of these rights, and
federal courts have barely weighed in.348 The courts should address
blockbuster questions of this kind after appropriate deliberation,
argument, and briefing.
Balancing tests invite judges to base their decisions on the relative
weight of a particular person’s interest in seeking or avoiding
procreation. These decisions can send a message that the Constitution
generally does or does not recognize a particular right without giving
courts the best possible opportunity to consider the many issues in play
in the ART context.
Balancing approaches also invite judges to impose their own views
about an individual’s desire to be (or not to be) a parent. As the history
considered here suggests, judges focus on the strength of the reasons
people have in making parenting decisions.349 In debate about
abortion, judges weighed people’s sexual histories, lifestyles, attitudes
about parenting, and life plans.350 Prejudices can affect the judgments
of courts applying a balancing analysis. These prejudices lead to
346. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Rooks, No. 15CA0990, 2016 WL 6123561, at *6–7
(Colo. App. Oct. 20, 2016) (finding husband’s interest in not producing offspring to
outweigh wife’s desire in having another child); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 716–19 (N.J.
2001) (holding wife’s desire to avoid biological parenthood outweighed husband’s
interest in using embryos); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 603–04 (Tenn. 1992)
(finding husband’s interest in avoiding parenthood outweighed wife’s interest in
donating unused embryos).
347. See, e.g., Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1162–63 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015)
(holding the wife’s interest in using embryos after becoming infertile outweighed
husband’s interest in not becoming a biological parent); Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131,
1140–42 (Pa. 2012) (same).
348. See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen & Eli Y. Adashi, Embryo Disposition Disputes: Controversies
and Case Law, 46 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 13, 13–14, 16, 18 (July–Aug. 2016),
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/hast.600.
349. See supra notes 327–335 (detailing the issues with the inconsistent application
of the balancing test following ambiguities in the Whole Woman’s Health decision).
350. See supra notes 153–159 (noting a woman’s hesitation to testify due to questions
about her sexual history and the subsequent subpoena of her physician).
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unpredictable results and to highly unfair outcomes. Someone’s
ability to become a parent—or avoid unwanted parenthood—should
not depend so much on judges’ personal proclivities and evaluations
of the parties’ characters.
The history studied here further suggests that balancing approaches
fail to deliver the kind of clarity that parties need when making vital
reproductive decisions. When pro-lifers championed men’s rights, the
outcome in court depended on the stories told by individual parties and
the ideological predisposition of individual judges.351 Following Whole
Woman’s Health, courts have also reached clashing decisions, reading the
facts differently and disagreeing about the relative weight of the
different factors to be balanced. Individuals and couples using ART
need legal guidance about the likely consequences of deeply important
personal decisions. Balancing approaches will not likely do the job.
A. Lessons from Family Law Contracting
Due to the potentially significant inefficiencies that are inherent
when using the balancing approach, a better alternative must be found
when analyzing ART cases. In looking for strategies for improvement,
we should look at the rules governing contracting in family law,
including those covering premarital agreements, mid-marriage
contracts, separation agreements, and surrogacy contracts. Of course,
embryo-disposition agreements are quite different from some of these
family law contracts. Separation agreements, for example, come into
a play after a relationship is over when a couple lays out how they want
to handle matters from marital property division to child custody.352
By contrast, couples routinely enter into embryo-disposition
agreements before a pregnancy takes place and when a romantic
relationship between partners is ongoing.353
Surrogacy agreements are also dissimilar from embryo-disposition
contracts. In most states, surrogacy is legal only under limited
circumstances, such as when a couple is unable otherwise to bring a
351. See supra notes 148, 183 and accompanying text (discussing the impact that a
personal story can have on a judge).
352. See, e.g., BRIAN H. BIX, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: FAMILY LAW
150 (2013) (explaining that courts tend to favor separation agreements over marital
agreements since separation agreements are made knowing that divorce is imminent
and the parties will likely not be “clouded by romantic feelings”).
353. See, e.g., Anne Drapkin Lyerly et al., Factors that Affect Infertility Patients’ Decisions About
Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 85 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1623, 1629 (June 2006) (explaining
that most clinics require consent forms to be filled out at the onset of treatment).
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pregnancy to term or only for couples rather than individuals.354
Surrogacy agreements thus focus partly on avoiding the legal missteps
that could otherwise void a contract. There are fewer laws limiting
access to IVF or regulating the disposition of excess embryos,355 and
embryo-disposition contracts do not seem to touch on some of the
concerns some hold about surrogacy, including the psychological risks
for surrogates and the exploitation of poor, non-white women as
gestational carriers.356 As important, surrogacy agreements deal
primarily with the relationship between respective parental rights of the
intended parents and the gestational carrier.357 Embryo-disposition
contracts, by contrast, should center on the wishes of the intended
parents and the relationship between them.
B. A Model for Contracting
While mid-marriage and premarital agreements both deal with
issues related to those in embryo-disposition contracts, prenuptial
contracts offer the best analogy. Couples enter into mid-marriage
agreements in some states when one spouse is contemplating
divorce.358 The agreements change the terms of property division
354. See Intended Parents:
Surrogacy Laws by State, SURROGATE.COM,
https://surrogate.com/intended-parents/surrogacy-laws-and-legal-information/surr
ogacy-laws-by-state (last visited Dec. 3, 2018) [hereinafter Intended Parents].
355. One of the most significant statutory controversies surrounding IVF involves
the variation in state laws on insurance coverage for infertility treatments. See, e.g.,
Sean Rossman, What Your Sexuality, Age and Location Have to Do with Your IVF Coverage,
USA TODAY (Apr. 24, 2017, 9:39 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nationnow/2017/04/22/what-your-sexuality-age-and-location-have-do-your-ivf-coverage/100594874.
356. There are plenty of concerns surrounding surrogacy. See, e.g., MARTHA FIELD,
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD (1993); BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, RECREATING
MOTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY IN A PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY 237 (1989);
CHRISTINE OVERALL, HUMAN REPRODUCTION: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES, POLICIES 113
(1993); JANICE G. RAYMOND, WOMEN AS WOMBS: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE
BATTLE OVER WOMEN’S FREEDOM 68 (1994); Anita L. Allen, The Black Surrogate Mother, 8
HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 17, 31 (1991) (raising racial concerns connected with the use of
surrogacy and advocating alternately for a ban on surrogate contracts or refusal to
enforce surrogate contracts); Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE
L.J. 293, 333–34 (1998); A.M. Capron & M.J. Radin, Choosing Family Law over Contract
Law as a Paradigm for Surrogate Motherhood, 16 L., MED. & HEALTH CARE 34, 36 (1988).
357. See Intended Parents, supra note 354.
358. See, e.g., Pacelli v. Pacelli, 725 A.2d 56, 58 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999)
(exemplifying a case where a plaintiff sought advice of counsel for mid-marriage
agreement when contemplating divorce). States have been more reluctant to enforce
agreements when a contract is not made in contemplation of divorce. See John Tingley
& Nicholas B. Svalina, Postnuptial Agreement Not Made in Contemplation of Imminent
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upon divorce and serve as a means of reconciling the parties.359 While
both mid-marriage and embryo-disposition agreements come into play
during intact relationships, the circumstances surrounding the forging
of these contracts can be quite different. Some courts tolerate midmarriage agreements, often called reconciliation contracts, as a way to
avoid divorce.360 Couples entering embryo-disposition contracts will
not often be contemplating separation or divorce.361 Indeed, before
IVF begins, couples may be unduly optimistic about the outcome of
ART procedures and the future of a romantic relationship.362 The
threat of abuse inherent in each type of agreement is also different.
Courts have criticized mid-marriage agreements because one partner
can leverage another’s attachment to an existing union to get a more
favorable property settlement.363 Embryo-disposition agreements
more often raise concerns because partners will not have thought out
possible contingencies or vital legal consequences.364
Prenuptial agreements and embryo-disposition contracts cover the
most common ground. Couples often enter into these types of
contracts before forging a legal relationship—when either partner
might have trouble anticipating changing circumstances. Optimism
bias might affect those entering into either type of agreement, and
since those forming either kind of agreement are usually in a

Divorce Affecting Property Rights on Separation or Divorce, in 2 MARITAL PROPERTY LAW § 27.8
(2d ed. Supp. 2015).
359. See, e.g., Abigail Trafford, A Mid-Marriage Change in the Rules May Make Sense,
WASH. POST (May 27, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2008/05/23/AR2008052302562.html (explaining that one of the goals of the
postnuptial agreement is for estate planning).
360. See, e.g., id. (identifying that some couples use mid-marriage agreements to
“heal” a marriage).
361. See, e.g., Deborah Forman, Embryo Disposition, Divorce, and Family Law
Contracting: A Model for Enforceability, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 378, 431 (2013)
(finding that because “couples entering into pre-marital contracts often suffer from
optimism bias,” they “seldom believe they will fall into divorce).
362. See, e.g., id.
363. See, e.g., Pacelli, 725 A.2d at 59 (explaining that a spouse can coerce a partner
into signing a mid-marriage agreement by threatening “the destruction of a family and
the stigma of a failed marriage”).
364. See, e.g., Forman, supra note 5, at 66–89 (summarizing research suggesting that
IVF participants do not fully grasp the consequences of their decisions or the impact
of informed-consent forms provided by clinics).
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functioning relationship, the parties to such an agreement will trust
one another and not bargain at arms’ length.365
The legal treatment of prenuptial agreements provides a starting point
for a new approach to embryo-disposition contracts. Some states still treat
all prenuptial agreements as inherently suspect, but many others honor
such contracts if certain procedural and substantive safeguards are in
place.366 States have attached special importance to “due process in
formation . . . and certain minimal standards of substantive fairness.”367
The most recent draft of the Uniform Premarital and Marital
Agreements Act (UPMAA) offers a starting point for states searching for
a better approach to embryo disposition.368 Under the UPMAA, a written
premarital agreement signed by both parties is unenforceable if the party
against whom enforcement is sought can prove one of the following: the
agreement was involuntary or the result of duress, the party seeking
enforcement did not have access to legal counsel, or the agreement was
signed without full financial disclosure by one of the parties.369 As an
alternative to legal counsel, the party seeking enforcement can point to a
notice of waiver of rights or a plainly written explanation of the rights and
responsibilities changed by the contract.370 Independently of these
procedural requirements, courts can refuse to enforce a term in the
agreement if, taken in the context of the agreement as a whole, the term

365. See Smith, supra note 21, at 208, 213 (discussing optimism bias in pre-marital
relationships); Forman, supra note 361, at 431 (explaining that couples entering into
pre-marital contracts specifically often suffer from optimism bias).
366. See J. Thomas Oldham, With All My Worldly Goods I Thee Endow, or Maybe Not: A
Reevaluation of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act After Three Decades, 19 DUKE J. GENDER
L. & POL’Y 83, 83–84 (2011). Some states require full disclosure of financial
information or require that each party have access to counsel. See, e.g., CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 46b–36g (2018) (requiring “fair and reasonable disclosure of the amount,
character and value of property, financial obligations and income of the other party”
and a “reasonable opportunity to consult with independent counsel” before a
prenuptial agreement will be enforced); see also Sean Hannon Williams, Postnuptial
Agreements, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 827, 838–39 (2007) (comparing various states’
requirements for enforceable prenuptial and postnuptial agreements).
367. UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT 2 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012)
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/premarital%20and%20marital%20agree
ments/2012_pmaa_final.pdf.
368. See id. at 1–2.
369. Id. § 9(a).
370. Id. § 9(a)(3).
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was unconscionable at the time of signing371 or enforcement of the term
imposes substantial hardship on one party.372
Underlying the provisions of the UPMAA are several core assertions.
First, the procedural focus of the act reflects a belief that independent
counsel or an alternative “is crucial for a party waiving important legal
rights.”373 The substantive dimensions of the UPMAA deal both with the
threat to economically-vulnerable parties and with outcomes that do not
even roughly correlate with the parties’ contributions to a marriage.374
Courts have looked at a variety of factors in measuring unconscionability.375
Unconscionability does not seem relevant to embryo-disposition
agreements. Courts view some contracts as unconscionable partly
because prenuptial agreements deal so heavily with money.376 If
enforcing an agreement will make one party dependent on the state for
support, for example, states often bar enforcement.377 Embryodisposition agreements do not deal with the division of financial assets.
Anxieties about the poverty of one party common to prenuptial agreements
will not arise in the context of embryo-disposition agreements.

371. Id. § 9(f).
372. Id. § 9(g).
373. Id. § 9 cmt.
374. See id. (explaining that when analyzing marital agreements, courts tend to look
at a number of financial factors, including the contributions made by each spouse and
the potential disparity that may arise if an agreement is enforced).
375. Id. (“[D]uration of the marriage, the purpose of the agreement, the current
income and earning capacity of the parties, the parties’ current obligations to children
of the marriage and children from prior marriages, the age and health of the parties,
the parties’ standard of living during the marriage, each party’s financial and
homemaking contributions during the marriage, and the disparity between what the
parties would receive under the agreement and what they would likely have received
under state law in the absence of an agreement.”).
376. Russ Alan Prince, How to ‘Bust’ Prenuptial Agreements, FORBES (Apr. 4, 2018, 7:22
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/russalanprince/2018/04/04/how-to-bust-prenuptialagreements.
377. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-36g(b) (1995) (“If a provision of a premarital
agreement . . . causes one party to the agreement to be eligible for support under a
program of public assistance . . . a court, notwithstanding the terms of the agreement,
may require the other party to provide support to the extent necessary to avoid such
eligibility.”); FL. STAT. § 61.079(7)(b) (2018); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.006 (West
1997) (following the format of the UPMAA); O’Daniel v. O’Daniel, 419 S.W.3d 280,
284 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (“[T]here is also a near universal exception which
precludes specific enforcement of such agreements if enforcement would deny to one
spouse support that he or she cannot otherwise obtain and therefore result in that
spouse becoming a public charge.”).
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Courts can also view agreements as unconscionable because they do
not reflect the contributions of each partner to a marriage.378 The law
of both marital property and spousal maintenance turns on the idea that
marriage is a partnership; each partner’s treatment after the dissolution
of a relationship mirrors what that person added to the partnership.379
The same principles do not govern embryo-disposition agreements.
However, the concerns about informed consent animating the
UPMAA resonate powerfully on in the context of embryo disposition.
Rarely do couples starting IVF consult a lawyer.380 Any explanation of
the rights imposed or waived by an agreement may be buried deep in
page-long forms that couples can easily miss.381
Of course, when parties sign most contracts, ignorance of the terms
of an agreement is not a defense.382 But in the case of either embryo
disposition or marriage, the stakes are considerably higher.383 Indeed,
when it comes to embryo disposition, constitutional rights may be in
play. As important, the parties to both kinds of agreement are not as
likely to defend themselves, trusting unduly in their partner and
exaggerating the odds of a favorable outcome.
By passing a model statute, states can make clear ex ante what the
parties need to do to ensure that courts will enforce an agreement.
Moreover, in mandating that agreements satisfy certain procedural
requirements, states can increase the odds that couples using IVF will
understand the gravity of embryo-disposition decisions.
1. The model statute
First, states should demand that embryo-disposition agreements be
voluntary. In the context of premarital contracts, courts have defined

378. See, e.g., Lane v. Lane, 202 S.W.3d 577, 583–84 (Ky. 2006) (finding an
prenuptial agreement unconscionable since it did not factor the wife’s important
contributions to the marriage as a homemaker); see also Gross v. Gross, 464 N.E.2d 500,
509–10 n.11 (Ohio 1984).
379. See, e.g., JILL ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED 73–84 (2014) (exploring
the ways courts determine marital contributions by each party, focusing specifically on
the economic contributions).
380. See, e.g., Forman, supra note 5, at 76, 85.
381. See, e.g., id. at 76.
382. See, e.g., Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U.S. 45, 50 (1875) (“That the defendant did
not read the charter and by-laws . . . was his own fault. It will not do for a man to enter
into a contract, and, when called upon to respond to its obligations, to say that he did
not read it when he signed it, or did not know what it contained.”).
383. See, e.g., Forman, supra note 5, at 70 (citing a 2011 study that showed substantial
evidence that embryo disposition decisions are “extremely difficult” to make).
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voluntariness in radically different ways.384 All states treat agreements
as involuntary if one couple used physical violence to coerce another
into signing on.385 Other states go further, treating an agreement as
involuntary if one partner presents it in the days immediately before a
wedding when it would be embarrassing, emotionally difficult, or
financially trying to refuse to sign.386 Which of these approaches makes
the most sense in the context of embryo disposition? If a couple must
enter into a contract before beginning IVF, there is nothing suspect
about forging an agreement shortly before a procedure begins.
Nevertheless, more extreme forms of duress, including domestic
violence, can shape the terms of an agreement, and courts should void
any contract resulting from it.
Second, states should require those entering into an embryodisposition agreement to have both access to independent counsel and
a full disclosure of the rights created or destroyed by different
disposition decisions. Access to counsel, in turn, should mean time to
identify appropriate representation. As an added safeguard, the
agreement itself should spell out the ramifications of each disposition
decision. Courts should resort to a balancing analysis only if an
agreement fails one of these enforcement criteria.
Such a model statute is far from perfect. Just as is the case with
prenuptial agreements, embryo-disposition agreements can come
before the courts years after their original signing. Given the delay
between contract formation and enforcement, it is hard for the parties
to anticipate changing circumstances. As the Witten Court notably
pointed out, people routinely change their minds about matters as
intimate as embryo disposition, and a model statute would still hold

384. See, e.g., Judith T. Younger, Lovers’ Contracts in the Courts: Forsaking the Minimum
Decencies, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 349, 359–400 (2007).
385. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 174 (AM. LAW INST. 2018).
386. Compare In re Marriage of Bernard, 204 P.3d 907, 910–13 (Wash. 2009) (en banc)
(finding agreement not enforceable when significantly revised version of premarital
agreement was presented a day before the wedding), and Peters-Riemers v. Riemers, 644
N.W.2d 197, 205–07 (N.D. 2002) (finding agreement presented three days before
wedding to be “involuntary” and emphasizing the absence of independent counsel and
adequate financial disclosure), with Brown v. Brown, No. 2050748, 19 So. 3d 920 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2007) (finding assent to agreement presented day before wedding to be
“voluntary”), aff’d sub. nom, Ex parte Brown, 26 So. 3d 1222, 1223–27 (Ala. 2009), and
Binek v. Binek, 673 N.W.2d 594, 596–98 (N.D. 2004) (finding agreement sufficiently
“voluntary” to be enforceable despite being presented two days before the wedding); see
also Mamot v. Mamot, 813 N.W.2d 440, 447 (Neb. 2012) (summarizing five-factor test
many courts use to evaluate “voluntariness” under the UPMAA).
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the parties to a contract that may not reflect their present-day feelings
about procreation.387 Inevitably, some couples will not enter into any
agreement or will disregard the consequences written into a contract.
After all, those beginning IVF are likely to be optimistic about both
their relationship to one another and the success of ART and may not
take seriously warnings about what an agreement truly entails.
Just the same, a model statute would represent a significant
improvement—one that has advantages that other alternatives do not.
Many of the informed-consent documents on which courts have relied
are not designed to deal with disputes between the parties using IVF.
There is evidence that parties cannot easily digest the information in
lengthy forms and almost never have the assistance of counsel in doing
so.388 Putting some guardrails in place will improve the odds that
contracts reflect the informed consent of both people who have
created embryos.
The model statute also will deliver fairer outcomes than the mutual,
contemporaneous consent approach recommended in Witten. Ideally,
the disposition of embryos would always reflect the consensus of both
embryo creators in the present day. In practice, however, embryodisposition disputes arrive in court because creators cannot arrive at
any such agreements.389
A mutual, contemporaneous consent
approach systematically disfavors the person seeking to use the
embryos.390 Such a result may not best capture any common ground
between the creators.
Other scholars have argued that courts should always side with a party
avoiding, rather than seeking, procreation.391
There are sound

387. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 781 (Iowa 2003).
388. See Forman, supra note 5, at 67, 76, 85.
389. See supra notes 102–104 and accompanying text (detailing the contemporaneous
consent approach used in Witten).
390. See supra notes 102–103 and accompanying text (arguing that the
contemporaneous consent approach inherently favors the party vying for the “status quo”).
391. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Rooks, No. 15CA0990, 2016 WL 6123561, at *6–7
(Colo. App. Oct. 20, 2016) (holding husband’s desire not to procreate outweighed
wife’s intention to use embryos, since husband may feel a “moral and social obligation”
to the biological child, even if no legal obligation would exist should the implantation
be successful); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 718 (N.J. 2001) (rejecting husband’s request
to use embryos, since doing so would force wife to become a biological parent against
her will); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992) (finding husband’s desire
to avoid procreation outweighed wife’s desire to donate embryos, since “[d]onation,
if a child came of it, would rob him twice—his procreational autonomy would be
defeated and his relationship with his offspring would be prohibited).
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arguments in support of this point.392 However, since the contours of the
rights to seek or avoid procreation remain unclear, the relative weight—
and boundaries—of the rights tied to genetic parenthood deserve much
further consideration before a court adopts a one-size-fits-all approach to
ART disputes. As judges hash out the constitutional rights in play in
embryo-disposition cases, courts should honor the informed, written
wishes of those mostly deeply affected by embryo disposition.
CONCLUSION
The front-page fight between Vergara and Loeb is just the most
notorious of the many battles about the disposition of embryos. The
courts have developed a number of approaches to these disputes, but
most have followed Kass, looking for a valid contract and applying a
balancing test if no such agreement can be found. In practice, balancing
analyses continue to play a vital role in embryo-disposition struggles.
Possible contracts—often informed-consent documents covering the
relationship between a clinic and a couple—may not address the most
important issues in embryo disposition. Although states have adopted
different versions, balancing analyses generally ask courts to weigh each
individual’s interest in seeking or avoiding genetic parenthood.
In the past, balancing tests have played a central role in determining
who has rights in the context of reproduction. Balancing approaches can
send a powerful message about the relative weakness of the constitutional
rights at stake in assisted reproduction. Balancing analyses also play to the
prejudices of judges about the character of individual litigants and the
relative merits of seeking or avoiding parenthood. Moreover, balancing
almost always guarantees uncertain outcomes, making it much harder for
couples to plan out their reproductive futures.
Looking to other family law contracts, particularly those governing
prenuptial agreements, provides guidance about how to improve the
odds that couples will make an informed, thoughtful decision about the
future of the embryos they create. Better contracts will hardly deliver
perfect results. But the fate of embryos is politically, personally, and
ideologically important. It is imperative that the law better encourages
people to take embryo-disposition decisions as seriously as they should.

392. See supra note 391.

